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   i  
SUMMARY 
 
Local elites who collaborate with a colonizing power are implicated into the 
colonial state matrix in different ways.  In a field of multiple collaborating elites, 
marginalized collaborators outwardly desire similitude towards other collaborators 
through integration.  But given an opportunity to disengage from a trajectory of 
integration, these marginalized collaborators would readily do so.  As to why 
these leaders of the marginalized would choose to disengage from the hegemonic 
narrative of the colonial state is the problematic of this investigation.  Following 
the history of Moros in the Philippines as context, and with the analysis of the 
Piang family as a case study, I posit that the Moro subject was 1) created through 
the process of colonial state building during the American regime and was 
internalized by the Moros leading to the colonial encounter-produced subjects; 2) 
that the Moro subject inflected ideas of difference that enabled them to disengage 
at the moment of possible excision from the emerging body politic.  I illustrate 
this by using the year 1926 wherein Mindanao and Sulu were nearly separated 
from the Philippines.  I posit that the process of subject formation related to the 
project of state building and the deployment of a cultural repertoire peculiar to 
them was the reason why the Moro elites under consideration disengaged from the 
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Introduction: Desiring Similitude, and Other Anxieties 
 “All datus must have realized by this time that, in spite of their people not 
having gone to school, they have already been deprived of most of their old 
powers and privileges as datus.  In the very near future, these datus are bound to 
have no more power unless they are educated or unless the people who will accept 
them as datus are educated” – Gumbay Piang, 1934 (JRH 27/30/2). 
 These were the words of Gumbay Piang when he wrote an open letter 
addressed to his fellow Moros.  With a closer reading of this particular passage, it 
is very hard to miss the anxiety, the feeling of exasperation, expressed by a Moro 
datu1 who was worried about the potential loss of authority because of the 
inflexibility or even the stubbornness of some leaders to the changing 
circumstances.  When Gumbay Piang wrote this letter in 1934, the tides have 
already changed its flow.  The winds have shifted in favor of Filipino nationalists 
with the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which secured for Filipinos the 
much-coveted status of political independence from the United States, a latecomer 
in the game of imperialism.2  The Philippines Islands – its bureaucracy, it’s 
political-economic structure (at the very least, on the surface) – were Filipinized, 
much to the delight of Manuel Quezon3 and his compatriots in their nationalist 
struggle that glorified the aborted republican aspirations.   Moros, and non-
Christian populations either stood at the aisle or partook in the serving of the 
American dish of eventual independence.                                                                                                                 
1 A local leader, oftentimes taken for royalty in the context of the southern Philippines.  In 
island Southeast Asia, datus, or datos, are similarly positioned in their respective society.  
The title is often inherited but can also be earned through the accumulation of wealth and 
power. 
2 The United States acquired the Philippine Islands under the 1898 Treaty of Paris 
wherein Spain, the defeated party in the Spanish-American War, ceded the Philippines, 
Guam, and Puerto Rico to the US in exchange for US$20 million dollars. 
3 Prior to his career as the first president of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, he was 
a vocal critic of the various Republican (US political party) administrators of the islands. 
Quezon was the leader of the Nacionalista Party, which openly advocated for expedited 
political independence for the Philippine Islands. 
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 In the context of the collaborative project of political independence for the 
Philippine Islands, I raise an issue that is largely ignored, or relegated to 
footnotes: desiring similitude.  The differences among the groups within the 
Philippine Islands were never a big secret.  Non-Christians, as they were called, 
were institutionally marked by the state through various mechanisms to 
exogenously disentangle whatever sameness that they have with the rest of the 
inhabitants of the islands (see Kramer 2006).  Shifting policies during the period 
of American colonialism led to the integration of the Moros into the rest of the 
Philippines’ population.  Accompanying the process, talk of assimilation, 
integration, and of responsibility littered the mass media (BIA 350/5/573/5075-A-
1), while speeches of solidarity and sameness became de rigeur among politicians 
who were based in Manila in the durée of American occupation (BIA 
350/5/574/5075A-30).  
 The US, in its self-appointed mission of spreading civilization by taking on 
the white man’s burden, embarked on a program of democratic tutelage (Taft, cf 
Go 2008, p.1), which 
basically opened up 
positions of power in 
the bureaucracy to able-
bodied colonial subjects 
as collaborators in the 
formation of the 
colonial state.  
Naturally, training institutions such as the public school system along with 
practical political education (Go 2008) were opened up.  Institutions of specialized 
Figure	   1.1	   (left)	   	   Datu	   Piang	   greets	   Secretary	   of	  War	  William	  
Howard	  Taft	  (courtesy:	  George	  Piang	  Trompeta)	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training for government service such as the University of the Philippines, the 
Normal School among others were instrumental in training a new cadre of 
collaborators.  Over time, leaders from the regions that have been marked by the 
colonial state as different became more and more like facsimiles of their 
counterparts from the Christianized 
parts of the colonial state.  
 The training entailed a swift 
transformation for some of the 
provinces in the Philippines.  Gowing 
(1983) reports that the Moro province 
registered one of the highest rates of 
economic growth across the islands.  
The transformation also brought about 
the rolling out of the machinery of the 
state, which included schools, 
hospitals and the like.  Here are photos 
that are of particular interest at this 
juncture.  Figure 1.1 captures the moment when Datu Piang of Cotabato met the 
highest-ranking civilian official of the US colonial government at that time, 
William Howard Taft.  The photo is taken from a postcard that was circulated 
circa  1905.  The fact that this kind of imagery was being circulated as a postcard 
evokes a certain sense of expansiveness and imperial power that is possessed by 
the US (see Balce 2006).  It also makes clear to the consumer of the image that the 
US can project its power widely (ibid).  Figure 1.2 is a photo of Datu Piang’s sons 
whom he sent to Manila to study under the colonial regime’s instrumentalities.  
Figure	  1.2	  	  Datu	  Piang’s	  sons,	  Abdullah,	  
Gumbay,	  and	  Ugalingan	  (courtesy:	  George	  
Piang	  Trompeta)  
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Figure	  1.3	  	  Map	  of	  the	  Philippines	  with	  marked	  places	  of	  interest;	  Moro	  Province	  highlighted	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After completing their studies in the schools set up in the province, these sons 
were sent to Manila to further their training in different fields – law, agriculture, 
and education – areas that were geared towards the expanding roles of the colonial 
state.  Another point of comparison that is of interest to us is the clothing articles 
used by the Piangs.  Between the father and the sons, there is an exhibition of 
cultural and performative departure that the younger generation of Moro leaders 
took.  This kind of representation, a deployment of varied cultural repertoires, 
illustrates to us at the material level what the Moros were performatively 
expressing – an underspoken desire for similitude, especially when one compares 
it to how Manila cliques carried themselves.  In a similar vein, Francis B. Harrison 
(1922), a former Governor-General at the time of the publication of his book, 
remarked that one Datu Alamada was initially adamant in going to Manila in 
order to visit Malacañang, the seat of governmental authority, in the year 1914 
after his surrender because he feared that he had to conform to the standards of 
Christian civilization.  The latter was finally convinced when he received: 
 …Assurance that he could carry his kris at all times, and that he would not 
 be obliged to wear “Christian” clothing.  Before the end of his first day in 
 Manila he had discarded his kris and surreptitiously procured an American 
 suit of clothes.  Upon his return to Cotabato, he became insistent in his 
 demands for schools (Harrison 1922, p.108). 
One would have to be blind and insensitive of elephantine proportions if one 
failed to note the allure that Manila and its veneer of civilization had to offer to 
these Moro datus.  The Moro datus, impressed with what they saw as cultural 
prowess was documented by Harrison to have wanted this prowess for themselves 
by “procuring… American suit of clothes” along with demands for schools to be 
built in his jurisdiction.  Manila was like a flame as these Moro leaders were the 
moths slowly sucked into the vortex of irresistible seduction. 
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 And at last we come full circle with the opening quotation from Gumbay 
Piang’s letter to his fellow Moros.  As I have mentioned earlier, the anxiety over 
the loss of the political potency of indigenous power structures was clearly 
intersecting with the desire for similitude by Moro leaders towards their colonial 
counterparts in the Christianized regions of the Philippine Islands.  While there 
are men like Datu Alamada who would so readily discard the tubaw4 for an 
“American suit of clothes,” we cannot deny the unevenness of this said desire.  
This project aims to delve further into this desire for similitude and similarly will 
be studying closely the intersection of the said desire with the dynamics of 
collaboration and colonial state building. 
 
Literature Review: Ethnographic Possibilities 
 Below is my attempt to narrate the historical background for the discussion 
of my arguments in the latter chapters.  Due to space constraints, I shall focus on 
the ethnographic sketches that enabled governmental tentacles to stretch out 
across the islands, and lastly, the trajectory and desires for the Moros as outlined 
by the existing literature. 
The census as a critical tool in the rolling out of the project of colonial 
state building has been discussed by other comprehensive works.5  Works such as 
                                                                                                                
4 A Mindanaoan head clothing. 
5 See for example, Rafael (2000), who discusses the imperatives of the census, 
discussing it as white love.  For a discussion on the census as an exercise in 
collaboration and racial politics, see Kramer (2006).  For a more analytical discussion on 
the importance of the census and of counting subject populations in the context of 
nationalism and Southeast Asia, see Anderson’s (1998) Spectre of Comparisons.  
Anderson (2008) also discusses the importance of the incidence of representations works 
of fiction that are used in census categories in his work titled Why We Count. 
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those establish the critical role that governmental instruments of “white love” play 
in the project of state building.  
While it seemed as if it was smooth sailing for the rolling out of the events 
related to the said project, things started to look much more complicated when the 
veritable internal Other(s) of the Philippine Islands were put under serious 
scrutiny: the hill-tribes from the mountainous regions and the southern Muslim 
groups that were barely touched by the limited reach of the former Spanish 
sovereign presented a stumbling block that became a challenge for US colonial 
officials.  The ethnographic representations of the inhabitants of the islands were 
subjects in a contentious debate – a series of disagreements on how to view the 
inhabitants of the islands, which Goh (2007a; 2007b) has written on.  The same 
predicament befell American authorities when they were confronted with the 
inhabitants of the island of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago.  The Muslim 
population of the said area was never fully subjugated by the Spanish authorities, 
very much like their hill-tribe counterparts in the north.  This contributed to the 
imageries that pro-imperialist groups in the US were projecting, that the 
Philippine Islands were indeed islands of different groups.  This served the dual 
purpose of displacing the image that nationalist mestizo elites were projecting in 
order to gain ascendancy in a seriality, or series of nations.6   
One of the things that I have as an operative assumption here is that the 
ethnographic malleability of the Moros was largely influenced by particular 
historical junctures.7  Lifting from Gowing (1983), I outline them as follows:                                                                                                                  
6 See Anderson (1998), who discusses the esoterics of his idea, the logic of seriality. 
7 Also, these ethnographic representations have been heavily influenced by Spanish 
colonial reports/accounts. 
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First, by the US Army, which administered Moroland during much of the critical 
period of its pacification and which saw the Moros as a martial race with their 
views oddly punctuated by its relatively recent experiences with the pacification 
of Native Americans in the westward expansion of the United States.  Theodore 
Roosevelt on the 4th of July 1902, possibly sitting comfortably on his chair in the 
Oval Office halfway across the world, proudly declared that the “Philippine 
Insurrection” has been dealt with (Kramer 2006; Golay 1997).  For the hill tribes 
in northern Luzon, power and authority were delegated by the Philippine 
Commission to the Constabulary forces, while in the Muslim south the US Army 
had a free hand (ibid). The consequences of dispensing American colonial 
governmentality through the US Army in the Moro province are tremendous.  For 
one, direct army rule in the special province meant that the process of developing 
a local pool of talent for local administrative operations took on a much slower 
pace when compared to the rest of the colony (Amoroso 2005).  The pastiche-like 
caricature of Moros as savages who needed protection from potentially 
exploitative Christian brothers from the north who are of the same “racial stock” 
and are supposedly totally incapable of self-government served to reinforce the 
said need to have an Army-led governmental structure in the south and also 
justified the systematic exclusion of Moros from participating significantly in 
governance (Gowing 1983; Thomas 1971; Davis c.f. Gowing 1983). 
Second, by colonial official ethnographers with particular attention to the 
person of Dean Worcester8 who played a critical role in the articulation of the 
                                                                                                                
8 Dean Worcester was a University of Michigan trained zoologist who was appointed by 
US President William McKinley as a member of the first Philippine Commission.  He is 
instrumental in the formation of key official ethnographic reports on the inhabitants of the 
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Moro racial identity and/or ethnicity to the socio-political body of the rest of the 
Philippine Islands – a strand that later on gained currency in the formation of the 
colonial nation-state matrix.  Key to the ethnographic representation of who or 
what the Moros were was the Philippine Ethnological Survey.  A successor 
agency of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, the Survey was tasked mainly with 
ascertaining the intricacies of the population of the islands.  Dean Worcester, a 
zoologist from the University of Michigan, was instrumental in the establishment 
of the said Bureau, which was officially transformed from the Bureau of Non-
Christian Tribes into the survey in 1903 (BIA 350/5/3833-3).  Thomas (1971) 
sums up Worcester’s policy for the Moros as follows: study, separate government, 
and paternalistic direction.  Goh (2007b) however discusses this further by 
historicizing and teasing out the political nuances of Worcester’s views.  Prior to 
the Republican-Democratic turnover of 1913, Worcester viewed the Moros as a 
savage race that needed to be repressed (ibid).  When the Republicans were 
booted out of power, Worcester perceived a betrayal of the American Manifest 
Destiny by their Democratic successors and advocated, nay, pleaded for the 
continued presence of Americans in the non-Christian areas to protect them from 
possible exploitation by the Christian Filipinos who were earlier on calling for 
independence, especially after the electoral debacle of the pro-American 
Federalistas in 1907 (ibid; Cullinane 2003). 
Third, Najeeb Saleeby,9 a Syrian-American doctor idealized the Moros 
through the transcription of oral traditions into text, which in turn had a profound                                                                                                                 
Philippines as he sat as the Secretary of the Interior for the Philippine Insular Government 
until 1913 after his tenure in the Philippine Commission. 
9 Najeeb Saleeby came to the Philippines on board the SS Thomas, a steamship that 
ferried American educators across the Pacific into the Philippines.  Known as the 
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impact on how Moros eventually came to view themselves in the future political 
interaction with the national/mestizo elites and the colonial officials from the US.  
He took on a different tack when it came to representing the Moros.  Dr. Saleeby 
used his knowledge of Arabic to study Moro culture and learned two Moro 
languages in the process (Thomas 1971).  His views about the Moros were largely 
informed by his dalliances with prominent Moro families from the Sulu 
archipelago to Mindanao (Gowing 1983).  He traced their ancestries, translating 
them into English rendering them visible to the colonial power, the American 
colonial officials, and consequentially to an emerging Anglophone Filipino 
audience as well.  Again, Thomas (1971) succinctly summarizes Saleeby’s views 
about the Moros: respectful understanding [read: religious tolerance], datu 
responsibility [read: traditional authority], and structural integrity [read: political 
stability].  The first necessitated a more dialogical understanding of the Moros, 
giving them a chance to represent themselves to their colonial overlords.  While 
he made references to Spanish texts in terms of how the Moros were to be viewed, 
or even having made references to British colonial management in the Malay 
states, Saleeby’s stood out as a representation that was more germane to the 
cultural and religious considerations of the Moros.  The bottom line is that his 
more patronizing and apologetic view of Moro hierarchy and authority translated 
into his representation of the Moros as a martial race, similar to the US Army’s 
narrative, but called for their leaders’ participation in government as a means to 
limit their powers (ibid).  Saleeby noted the binding potential of occupying                                                                                                                 
Thomasites, the passengers are largely credited for the massive expansion and success 
of the American-established public education system.  Saleeby was stationed in the 
southern Philippines where he was acquainted with Moro culture and subsequently 
published books on the customs, laws, and practices of the aforementioned.  He became 
an authority on Moro culture and political practices. 
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positions of power in government and suggested that their leaders be given limited 
roles where powerful leaders should be placed in executive positions, effectively 
placing them under direct supervision, while giving lesser leaders concessions in 
perfunctory legislative posts. 
 
Problem and Thesis Statement 
 Mentioned in the introduction was the ability of the colonial state to mark 
ethnicities and differences.  In the critical years of the American occupation of the 
Philippines, colonial categories were made visible by instruments of state 
building, such as census-taking, poll taxation, among others; these were largely 
instituted from the top (Rafael 2000; Kramer 2006; Abinales 2000; Gowing 1983).  
However, this should in no way necessarily mean that the creation of the said 
categories was the exclusive prerogative of the colonial state.  Certainly, a large 
part of the process involved the responses that these moves elicited from below.10  
Of large import here is one of George Steinmetz’ (2007) four determening 
structures of colonial native policy.  He talks about the incorporation of 
precolonial ethnographic discourse or representation (ibid).11  Another critical 
component of colonialism that led to the success of it is collaboration.  
Collaboration is an element of colonialism that one must take into account for 
without the cooperation and collaborative endeavors of indigenous elites, imperial 
                                                                                                                
10 Rafael (2000) and Kramer (2006) discuss the role of Filipinos in the deployment of 
personnel across the island to conduct the first ‘scientific’ census in the Philippines. 
11 The other three are as follows: 1) the competition for recognition of superior 
ethnographic acuity by colonial officials; 2) the colonizers’ cross-identification with 
culturally and physically constructed image of the colonized; and 3) responses by the 
colonized (Steinmetz 2007). 
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adventures would not have had so much success in the course of history 
(Robinson 1972; Steinmetz 2007).  One manifestation of the collaborative work of 
local elites is how they responded to the push and pull of the colonial state’s 
movement from its center.  An empirical and theoretical puzzle is laid bare before 
our eyes at this point – what then were these responses, and why these kinds of 
responses; how do they fit together, and what picture does it offer?  Initially, I  
proposed that there were actions or non-actions taken by Moro elites in response 
to the colonial state’s act of marking them as different from the rest of the islands’ 
inhabitants: a desire for similitude – along with the heaves and throes of Filipino 
nationalism – coupled with the US’ flippancy with regard to the political status of 
its “unincorporated” and “insular” possessions. 
 Before I discuss further the reaction of marginalized elites to the potential 
disengagement from the hegemonic narrative of colonial state-building trajectories 
I wish to address two things: first, that the elites received a different kind of 
political education.  The Moros were placed under a different regime because of 
the bifurcation of colonial state policies as it was shaped or at least influenced by 
how the ethnographic survey envisioned the colonial subjects.  While the Moros 
were marked as civilizationally deficient in comparison to their counterparts in the 
Christianized regions of the Philippines, they were also idealized at the same time.  
In fact, there were various potential trajectories that were discursively set by 
colonizing forces in collaboration with the Moros themselves.  The Moros were 
marginalized in terms of their position with the rest of the Christianized 
population of the Philippine Islands, especially when placed within the continuum 
of civilization that the American colonial state inscribed upon the matrix of the 
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geo-body of the Philippine Islands.12  Second, as the Moros were placed under a 
different regime and were separated administratively, they were at the onset of 
colonial state building insulated from the development of the electoral politics.  It 
was 1907 when the Philippine Assembly was established with representatives 
from all parts of the colonial state convened.  All members in the assembly were 
elected by landed, educated and male Filipinos, except for the US appointed 
representatives from the separately administered jurisdictions of the Mountain and 
Moro Provinces (Golay 1997; Gowing 1983; Abinales 2000a).  While this 
privileged certain families and individuals in the Moro Province by having made 
gains with regard to the collaborative matrix with the Americans, this also 
deprived them of an opportunity to parlay with their collaborative counterparts 
from the other parts of the colony who exercised in suffrage on more equitable 
terms.  As the development of the colonial state shifted and gathered around the 
pole of the Filipino nationalist cause, the Moro elites were left in a marginalized 
position. This research explores the intersection of the desire for similitude and 
the dynamics of collaboration and colonial state building.  This is the contention 
that this thesis puts forward: marginalized collaborating local elites outwardly 
exhibit a desire for similitude with the rest of their fellow colonial elites when 
placed towards a trajectory of eventual political independence. But when 
presented with an opportunity to disengage from the hegemonic narrative of 
colonial state-building trajectories, they become potential counter-elites who 
compete for the colonial master’s gaze.  
                                                                                                                
12 I deploy Thongchai’s (1994) concept at this juncture, while emphasizing the artificiality 
of the union of Las Islas Filipinas and Morolandia. 
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 This is where the turning point of 1926 becomes very relevant to the 
proposition that I’ve put forward, with the year being the time when the said 
opportunity to disengage was presented when a congressman from New York 
filed and lobbied for the passage of a bill that sought to separate the purported 
Moro homeland from the rest of the Philippines.  The year 1926 is a turning point 
that allowed for the expression of sentiments that were swept under the rug, which 
would have otherwise been left unsettled had it not for such an opportunity.  
When opportunities for marginalized elites come about, and given a particular set 
of circumstances, I’ve posited that they would be more inclined to disengage from 
the hegemonic narrative of colonial state-building trajectories – in the particular 
case that I talk of, that of the Philippines’ path towards political independence as 
guaranteed in the Jones Law of 1916.13  The question now is why would these 
elites choose to disengage from the said narrative?  Why not side with the rest of 
the Filipino leaders who have petitioned that the said bill be junked and that ideas 
pertaining to the separation of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan not be entertained? 
 There are multiple ways of possibly answering this question.  Coming 
from several traditions and theoretical positions, the question may be addressed, 
though we may come up with different answers.  One of the possible ways of 
which is by taking a rational choice approach on the matter.  The fundamental 
assumption of this theoretical purview is that actors are rational, utility 
maximizers, and that they choose according to what’s best for their own interests 
(Kiser & Schneider 1994; Turner 2006).  Following this assumption, we can say 
that Moro elites have basically chosen to disengage because they have deemed it 
                                                                                                                
13 The Jones Law of 1916 outlined the rapid turnover of command in the bureaucracy 
from American to Filipino hands.  More on this in the next chapter. 
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to be in their best interests.  There are many studies that have employed rat-
choice, which are accompanied by critiques against them.  Julia Adams (1999), 
for example, criticizes the works of Kiser & Barzel (1991) and Levi (1988) in 
their use of the rational choice approach in the study of the state.  She uses Europe 
as an archive for her critical reading of the choice of theoretical lenses of analysis 
(ibid).   Adams (1999) points out the weaknesses of the assumptions of rational 
choice theory – that in using rat-choice as a theoretical tradition for analyzing 
state formation, one would have to privilege the rulers, or the ruling class in the 
ascertaining the trajectories of the project.  In other words, theirs is a court-centric 
approach.  While it’s true that I’m using the biographies of individuals and of a 
particular family and that they may be deemed as collaborating elites as a case 
study, one would need to take cognizance of the fact that the parameters of the 
field involves structural conditions that would be difficult to trace with rational 
choice analysis.  And even if one takes the assumption that these actors were 
rational (read: utility maximizers) at the end of the day the issue at hand, which is 
the explanation of why the Moro elites have chosen to disengage from the 
hegemonic political trajectories of the colonial state, cannot be reached 
sufficiently.  In fact, the answer would be completely tautological if rational 
choice theory is used: that the actors involved were rational and utility 
maximizers, full stop. 
 Another way of approaching this is by taking a nativist position.  Marshall 
Sahlins (1995) in his discussion of how natives perceive outsiders for example 
demonstrates to us the power that culture has in shaping our actions and 
perceptions.  The idea that there is a mine or an historical archive for an individual 
from where her/his actions come from is not totally unsound.  In fact, this was one 
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of the main contentions that he made in his work – he was reacting against the 
notion of a rational and utility maximizing man (ibid).  Following this logic, we 
may say then that the Moros were responding according to their innate traditions; 
that they are mining the archive of their cultural experiences and traditions.  
Herein lies the problem: the idea that a set of culture and tradition is readily 
available for the collaborating Moro elites to refer to when they responded to the 
push and shove of colonial state building is quite problematic.  Abinales (2000a) 
for one criticizes an identity based approach in understanding Moro responses.  In 
that particular case he was seeking for an explanation to the Moro rebellion of the 
relatively recent past (ibid).  He said that previous scholarship emphasizing 
identity in their analyses failed to see the structural issues (ibid; see for example 
Gomez 2000; Brown 1988; Buendia 2002; Buendia 2001; Tan 1997; Gowing 
1979; George 1980; Ahmad 1982; Mercado 1984).  Also, interpreting cultural 
systems in this manner brings up the Geertzian dilemma of having a framework, 
while able to explain the internal dynamics of a community through a “shared 
meaning system,” that fails in the task of explaining interactions with 
externalities, or foreign intrusions (Go 2008).  More importantly, if we use a 
nativist position in the analysis of the actions of collaborating Moro elites, the 
problem of assuming a relatively stable Moro identity and subjectivity existed 
because of some historical convergence of interests (i.e. the Moro Wars) negates 
the argument that the Moro identity and subjectivity is a relatively recent 
formation, which this thesis is using as a central assumption in its understanding 
of the formation of a Moro subject.. 
 I humbly submit a third position – and some may describe it as a middle 
way – as to why Moros would then disengage from the hegemonic narrative if 
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given a chance: I posit that the Moros were responding as newly formed colonial 
subjects.  The Moro subject position was 1) imagined and made real by the 
American colonial state and was internalized by the Moros themselves leading to 
the colonial encounter-produced subjects; 2) these subjects inflected ideas of 
difference that enabled them to disengage at the moment of possible separation 
from the emerging political body.14  First, the Moro as an identity is a subject 
category whose creation was facilitated by the mechanisms of colonial state 
building.  The ethnographic survey, for one, and the accompanying representation 
of how the Moros were perceived by the Americans (US Army, Worcester, 
Saleeby, et al) became a repertoire that the Moros readily deployed.  The same 
mechanism, that of colonial state building, articulated previous representations of 
what the Moros were perceived to be in the Spanish accounts.  The colonial 
encounter, not only reified these older representations, but also rallied around a 
central pole what the Americans believed to be an unproblematic Moro identity.  
The responses taken by Moros to gather around the said pole does not preclude 
agency on their part.  The fact that they were able to strategically fit themselves 
into the newly made subject category affirms their agential capacities.  The 




                                                                                                                
14 There is a degree of self-essentialism here among the Moro elites.  While there are 
esoteric issues pertaining to essentialism per se that are quite problematic, this is not the 
focus of the thesis.  What the thesis zeroes-in on is the fact that there was strategic self-
essentialism and that the this thesis will not delve further into the chief problematic of the 
debate on essentialism. 
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 This project that I embark on utilizes a large amount of archival data.  
Majority of the materials that has been put under consideration and under careful 
scrutiny are largely texts that have been transcribed, written, catalogued, and 
stored in archives located in different places on both sides of the Pacific, across 
the Tropic of Cancer.  Other than archival materials, I conducted one incidental 
interview in order to reference and triangulate the historical/biographical character 
of the case study under scrutiny. 
 Materials from the American Historical Collection at the Ateneo de Manila 
University’s Rizal Library were most instructive in giving me signposts as to 
where to go with respect to my topic.  I was quite amazed with the amount of 
primary materials that I found in both the National University of Singapore 
Libraries and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.  In the US, the newspaper 
archives in the Los Angeles County Library were of much value.  Utilized in the 
archival work were the Bureau of Insular Affairs files stored in the US National 
Archives 2 in College Park, Maryland.  I also made use of the Joseph Ralston 
Hayden Papers in the University of Michigan libraries in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 
 Methodologically, I take the tools of an historical-comparative sociologist 
using largely historical institutionalism as a means to grapple with the process of 
colonial state building.  Historical institutionalism usually entails a lot of case 
studies, and this project is no exception to the trend. 
 I study the process of colonial state building and how it intersects with the 
biography of a family.  In particular, I focused on the Piang family, mainly 
looking at the patriarch, Datu Piang, and his sons, with particular attention to the 
youngest among his male heirs-apparent, Gumbay Piang.  I focused on Gumbay 
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Piang among the heirs for two reasons: 1) the amount and availability of data on 
Gumbay Piang is better in terms of quantity and quality – he wrote letters and 
statements in private and in public that were preserved in archives and collected 
by his heirs.; 2) the last prominent Piang who partook in national politics was 
Gumbay, which in a certain way puts an important historical juncture (in this case, 
person) under closer scrutiny.  While doing so, I attempted to trace the contours of 
colonial state building and collaboration, and their intersection with the desire for 
similitude.  The Piang family, while not being the only Moro elite family at the 
time, is of particular interest and of importance because of their prominence in the 
Cotabato district, an area in Moroland that was touted to be the most peaceful 
district at the time of American occupation (Gowing 1983).  This relative peace is 
instructive of some successes in collaborative strategies thus it has merit to be 
studied.  Also, Datu Piang was “believed to be the most powerful Magindanao 
strongman of his time” (Abinales 2000b).  I feel that it is worthwhile to look at the 
decline of this “prowess” (Wolters 1999) along with the generational transition 
and how it is embedded in the process of colonial state building. 
 With regard to the use of biographies in the historical study of 
collaboration and colonial-/nation- state building, I take off from Alfred McCoy 
(2000) who pointed out that biographies have historiographically shaped 
Philippine history and that they are generally accepted as a form of knowledge 
production.  In my project’s case, I employ not just the biography of a person, but 
also the biography of a family.  Similarly, McCoy (1994) has argued that it is 
worthwhile transplanting a Latin-American studies habit of focusing on elite 
families in the study of history in general.  The family does allow for a unique 
perspective as it offers to us a more longitudinal angle rather than focusing on a 
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person’s biography alone.   The problem with this approach is that it is not of 
convention to focus on families in Southeast Asia as an area of study (ibid).  I 
would argue that employing a relevant methodology (which McCoy et al have 
already done; ibid) from a different region of the world would allow us to have a 
more global vista.  Indeed, Resil Mojares’ study of the Osmeñas is the perfect 
example of my attempt to study intergenerational shifts when he studied 3 
generations of the Cebu-based political clan. 
 This project will be taking on the breadth of the American colonial period 
and 3 years beyond, from 1898 to 1949.  I end the study at the death of Datu 
Piang’s son, Gumbay.  I do so because it has been noted by scholars that his death 
marked the exit of the Piangs in national politics (Abinales 2000b).  Another key 
element in the span of history under consideration is the emphasis that I shall be 
giving to 1926 as a turning point in the particular study.  I do so with cognizance 
of its role in the formation of the Moro subject and its implication with the said 
desire for similitude. 
 Finally, a disclosure: Datu Piang, Gumbay Piang are my kin – my great-
great-grandfather and great-grandfather respectively.  The impact that this 
sanguine connection that I have with the main characters of the biographical 
sketches used in this study of the American colonialism and colonial state building 
manifests itself in a variety of ways.  For one, writing negative or adversarial 
notes about Datu Piang and Gumbay Piang would certainly earn me the ire of my 
extended family.  This however does not prevent me from doing so.  I am aware 
of the family versions of the stories surrounding the two central characters in this 
particular study and even with this knowledge I deferred to the academically and 
historiographically accepted versions when the evidence is stacked against the 
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former and in favor of the latter – a move that was critically questioned at one 
point by a very close relative.  The connection can also be downplayed in this 
particular fashion: I was born and raised in Manila, and from that geographical 
standpoint I am an outsider to Magindanao society.  It is by the accident of kinship 
that I have a spectre of a connection to the polity under consideration.  This 
spectral and ambivalent condition is a double-edged sword as it puts me in 
insider/outsider position.  The bottom line is that it accords me the necessary 
critical distance to write and talk about the said topic with a certain degree of 
rigor. 
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Chapter 2: Collaboration and Subject Formation 
The Moros, the State, and Subject Formation 
 In this Chapter, I will explore the process of collaboration and subject 
formation among the Moros prior to the turning point of 1926 (discussed further 
in the succeeding chapter).  Along with this exploration, I shall be delving into the 
variables of subject formation, which I have posited to be critical in the 
explanation as to why the Moros responded the way they did during the said 
turning point of 1926, and inevitably to the said desire for similitude.  The main 
variables that I pay attention to in this chapter are 1) the process of collaboration 
vis-à-vis colonial state building, 2) the cultural repertoire that was the 
consequence of the process of subject formation.  The two main variables 
mentioned above are not mutually exclusive and are very much intertwined as 
revealed in an example that I take below, the story of the Piang family starting 
from the patriarch to his sons. 
 Most of the literature dealing with Moros, as discussed in the previous 
section along with the noted criticism, takes on the rubric of ethnicity and 
religious difference as some form of axis.  There is a tendency in the literature 
(Buendia 2001 & 2002, for example) to deal with the colonial categories in a very 
ahistorical manner, wherein the historicity (read: the colonial historical baggage) 
of the categories is effaced.  Furthermore, a lot of these works border on 
essentialism, and there is a tendency to obsess over identities that are assumed to 
be stable, symptomatic of a symbolic-interactionist framework.  The danger of 
this approach is the tendency to equate ethnicity as a subjective position in a 
totalizing manner.  The same set of literature tends to talk about historical 
grievances but fail to tease out the nuances of how the categories were historically 
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constructed (ibid).  I take a more Andersonian stance when it comes to dealing 
with ethnicities – that these categories are part of the central logic of state 
surveillance and are part of the process of russification, specifically through that 
of the census, and more importantly are embedded in history (Anderson 1998 & 
2006).  These markers of difference according to the logic of the state, while 
disaggregating the population, were a means for binding the populace into a 
project of creating a polity for a particular geo-body.  The disaggregation and 
subsequent binding of the population allowed the colonial government to 
determine which particular ethnic group was to be placed in its continuum of 
civilization, whether to classify them as civilized or not.  What interests me in this 
project is the appropriation of such identities/categories, whether imagined or not, 
by the intended target population, a form of strategic self-essentialism in light of 
subject formation.  In particular, the Moros, along with the hill tribes in the north, 
were constantly juxtaposed with the rest of the Christianized lowland communities 
across the islands within the context of of “democratic tutelage” embarked upon 
by the Americans for Filipinos, or for the inhabitants of the islands, and given the 
pronouncement made by William McKinley and by Taft that the islands were to 
be taught to govern themselves, the logical trajectory was autonomy at the very 
least, or at best, political independence.  Placed in this particular trajectory, Moro 
leaders gradually learned to acknowledge their marginalization within the new 
geo-body and carefully adapted to the new circumstances that beset them 
(Abinales 2000a).  Moro leaders who previously held an entrepôt orientation 
much like their Southeast Asian river-mouth society cousins were forced to 
imagine themselves within the frame of the colonial state and the budding Filipino 
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nation (Abinales 2000a; 2000b).1  This is why I highlight the significance of the 
desire for similitude.   
 I take as a point of departure elements of postcolonialism, and theoretical 
notions of colonial state building in ascertaining the dynamics of the said desire.  
With regard to subject formation and the configurations of collaboration between 
the actors in the field of colonialism, Anderson’s work on nationalism (2006) 
comes to the fore once more.  First is the logic of seriality, or more specifically 
what he refers to as a bound seriality where the population of a particular territory 
is accounted for in the census and classified according to the whatever logic that 
prevails in the ideology of the state (ibid).  This process is two-fold as I have 
slightly alluded to in the previous chapter.  First is the state classifying the people, 
and the second is the identification of a people to the categories presented before 
them.  The categories constructed may deploy already existing conventions or 
ideas about a particular “ethnicity” or “race.”  In a nutshell, there is a degree of 
strategic self-essentialism that pervades the manner in which the people negotiate 
their engagement with the state and how they position themselves within a societal 
matrix.  Also, Homi Bhabha’s (2006) ideas are relevant in light of the changes 
brought about by the development of the state.  Specifically, I identify one of 
Bhabha’s notions as significant in this endeavor – that of mimicry.  Bhabha notes 
that colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other – as a 
subject of difference that is almost the same, but not quite (ibid).  Another 
attendant issue when mimicry is discussed is the formation of subjects.  The                                                                                                                 
1 This form of adaptation is also reminiscent of the pattern among Southeast Asian big 
men, or orang besar, that Oliver Wolters (1982) talks about, wherein one leader would 
project her/his power through an overlord, in many cases colonial masters.  Though one 
could argue that this is not an exclusively Southeast Asian trait and is generally present 
across imperial expansions especially in cases of collaborative regimes (see Robinson 
1977). 
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notion of subject formation during the colonial encounter is nothing new as Homi 
Bhabha (2006) specifically identifies mimicry as a vehicle in the formation of 
colonial subjects.  In the same essay, he identifies Charles Grant’s (cf Bhabha 
2006) idea that the British wanted to implement in the subcontinent.  Grant 
referred to it as a “reform of manners,” which Bhabha tags as a “system of subject 
formation” (ibid).  Furthermore, he notes that mimicry is also the mockery of 
colonial discourse, and that in the process of creating colonial subjects (of 
difference), it is “at once resemblance and menace” (ibid).  However, when one 
pays closer attention to the field under consideration, there is not a clear 
colonizer/colonized dichotomy; not even an exclusive colonial subject especially 
when located in the field of American imperialism in the Philippines.  At first 
glance it may seem that a demographic entity known as Filipinos were the 
colonial subjects created by the colonial encounter.  This assumption is 
problematic when one considers who the colonial subjects are in the Philippine 
Islands.  At the inception of American colonialism, there was a clear move to 
ethnically and racially divide the islands with the intention of mapping the 
populace.  One result of this division is visible in the structure of the colonial 
state: the bifurcation of the jurisdictions, between the Christianized lowland 
Filipinos, and the hill-tribes and the Moros who were placed under special care by 
the Americans.  This is a clear instance of the intersection of the formation of 
identities / subject formation, and of the process of colonial state building.  As a 
result, the Americans had to deal not only with a single set of collaborators, but 
also with a multiplicity of collaborators who are ethnically and sometimes racially 
marked as different.  This should not be construed as a homogenization of the 
Christianized lowland Filipinos as they are also inscribed into different tribes, 
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which in turn became the justification for the suppression of what the Americans 
called the tyranny of one tribe over another during the Philippine-American War 
(Kramer 2006).  
 
The Colonial Encounter and the Moro Repertoire 
 Colonialism as we know it would not have been successful had it not been 
for the thousands of local collaborators that whatever empire managed to control 
across the world (Robinson 1972).  The expansiveness of the British Empire, for 
example, is clear evidence of the successes of colonialism through collaborative 
means (ibid).  While it is true that some colonies were manned almost exclusively 
by settlers, other colonial bureaucracies were staffed with locals trained in the 
craft and the language of colonial administration.1 The Philippines was not an 
exemption from this field.  While the Catholic religious Orders were the main foot 
soldiers of the Spanish colonial state in the Philippines for over 300 years, the 
Castilian empire still employed collaborators at the local level.2 
 One very important element of colonialism and collaboration that is of 
interest at this juncture is the formation of colonial subjects.  I’ve noted the 
significance of Homi Bhabha’s ideas regarding the formation of colonial subjects 
– that in the process of colonial mimicry, a process that entails the formation of a 
recognizable other, there emerges a colonial subject that is in Bhabha’s (2006) 
own words, “white, but not quite.”  This of course refers to the fact that the                                                                                                                 
1 Robinson (1972) identifies the different patterns of colonialism and collaboration by 
elaborating on the differences between the administration of settler colonies and that of 
non-settler colonies. 
2 For a discussion and analysis of Spanish colonial expansion into the Philippines, see 
Rafael (1988). 
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process of mimicry attempts to create subjects out of, say for example local 
collaborators, who are formed to be able to dispense what the colonizer believed 
they themselves to be capable of.  A classic example, as already mentioned, is the 
formation of colonial subjects through the process of evangelization that Rafael 
(1988) talks of.  Others, such as Kramer (2006) trace the said process of subject 
formation during the American colonial period. 
 For the Moro south, the process, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was 
placed in a circumstance of exception at least within the Philippine Islands, thanks 
to the ethnographic dissonance peddled by colonial officials, which in turn 
resulted to the bifurcation of the colonial state.  The ethnographic plane of the 
Philippines was characterized as that which exhibited a multiplicity of identities – 
that the Filipino nation as portrayed by the nationalist revolution of 1898 is 
nothing but a convenient agglomeration of elitist interests of different tribes across 
the islands (ibid).  The issue that this representation, made more scientific by 
employing academic (read: scientific) lenses in the ethnographic survey and 
through anthropological studies, is nothing but imperial propaganda made 
deliberately to justify the US’ actions in the islands is not the point here.  The 
consequences of this particular ethnographic representation nevertheless led to the 
different terms of engagement and collaboration.  The US Army was tasked to 
govern the savage Moros in the newly acquired possessions’ south.  Until the 
Moros were released from Army rule, they were deprived of the kind of training 
that the Americans bestowed upon the Christian lowland population in the rest of 
the islands such as the direct handling of local affairs, or even the opportunity to 
run for public office under the established electoral terms of 1906 (Golay 1997). 
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 What then was the Moro repertoire in terms of parlaying with their 
counterparts in Manila, the rest of the Philippines, or even with their colonial 
masters?  I have argued in the previous chapter that the Moros had as a repertoire 
a new subjectivity that was the result of the colonial encounter.  On the whole, 
I’ve posited that the Moro subject was formed through the process of colonial 
state building – that this occurred through the expansion of the colonial state’s 
gaze through the deployment of the Ethnological Survey, the expansion of the 
educational system, and the solidification of the positions that was outlined in the 
previous chapter whereas the Moros were viewed as a matrial race, and as a 
civilization with a preexisting set of traditions and history. 
 
Variables in Collaboration and Subject Formation: Datu Piang’s Case 
 Paying close attention to the variables mentioned in the previous sections, 
we now turn to our case at hand, Datu Piang.  Zooming in on the variables of 
collaboration and state formation, and of one’s cultural repertoire and subject 
formation, Datu Piang becomes an interesting case.  He was the indisputable 
leader of his time in Cotabato thanks to his skillful parlaying with the Americans 
as an external power in Magindanao.3  Prior to Datu Piang, Sultan Kudarat was 
the only leader in Magindanao society who was able to unite the sa-ilud (river 
mouth) and sa-raya (inland) datus under one wing, albeit Datu Piang being able to 
do it with the aid of American might (Abinales 2000a; Tarling 2001).  So what 
                                                                                                                
3 Note the difference between Magindanao and Maguindanao, with the latter referring to 
today’s Maguindanao province.  On the other hand Magindanao refers to the societal 
matrix that occupied the geographical coordinates of the Cotabato district of the old Moro 
province. 
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accounted for his ability to parlay effectively with the Americans?  Marrying 
American firepower with his political agility and his business connections with 
the Chinese traders in Magindanao, Datu Piang was able to emerge as one of the 
more successful cases of collaboration in the Philippines, with his district being 
credited as the most peaceful area of the Moro Province at the time (ibid; Beede 
1994).  In Philippine history, Datu Piang is neither a hero nor a saint.  Instead, he 
is painted as one who forayed into the grey areas of political control, choosing to 
take advantage of the colonizing power’s prowess – military and economic – in 
order to protect his own interests and diminish those of his rivals’.  Abinales 
(2000a; 2000b) talks about this in the context of the transformation of Datu Piang 
as a Southeast Asian orang besar,4 into a ‘colonial big man’ whose vista was 
limited into the colonial state’s geo-body from a regional one – from seeing 
Singapore, Borneo, and Ternate as his horizon, into the spatial configuration or 
geo-body of the colonial state.  Further, Datu Piang needs to be understood as a 
Southeast Asian interlocutor, very much like those of the Malay river-mouth 
societies (Abinales 2000a; Andaya 1993).   
 One typical behavior that Southeast Asian orang besars exhibited is that 
when they encounter a potent force they can project it against their enemy to allow 
for their own advancement (Wolters 1999).  Vic Hurley (1936), an American 
soldier recounts how at one point the Sultan of Sulu tried to bargain with the US 
officials if he could fly the US flag along with his own.  As Datu Piang is said to 
have ambitions for attaining political dominance, the budding orang besar chose 
initially to secure Spanish support in order to magnify his capacities (Tarling 
                                                                                                                
4 (Bahasa Melayu/Indonesia) Literally, big man. 
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2001).  When the Americans came, Datu Piang, perhaps out of political 
expediency, chose to shift his allegiance to the obviously more powerful force.  In 
one account, a Spanish Colonel paid Datu Piang a visit after their withdrawal 
when the Americans made their advance in the island (Moses 2008).  The said 
Spanish military officer asked Datu Piang what he had done to the cross, ribbon, 
and band that he had given the Moro datu as a token of amity between the local 
chief and the Spanish Crown, to which the leader replied to by saying “I threw 
them into the river” (ibid).  The Spanish Colonel was obviously shocked and 
demanded an explanation from the datu (ibid).  “When the Spanish government 
came it raised hell and fight us all the time” (sic), and that when the Americans 
came they “treated me like a brother,” explained Datu Piang (ibid).  Clearly Datu 
Piang has found a new source of power to project against his enemies.  And in 
typical orang besar form where authority is always mystified with the ability to 
perform supernatural acts, it is rumored that Piang had a similar ability to that of 
Datu Uto (McKenna 1998).  At the height of his power, Datu Uto5 was said to be 
able to kill anyone whom he wanted to by merely pointing his finger at the victim 
(ibid).  Somehow, Datu Piang replicated this ability as recounted through the oral 
narratives passed on by the people of contemporary Cotabato City (ibid).  In the 
said narrative, Datu Piang can kill anyone whom he pleases to by pointing his 
finger at that person and by reciting an incantation: “enemigo,” which in Spanish 
means enemy (ibid).  This supernatural prowess can probably be associated with 
the fact that he was projecting the backing that he received from an external 
power, the first one being Spain.  This ‘ability’ was continued during the 
                                                                                                                
5 Prior to Datu Piang’s ascent to power, Datu Uto held considerable influence in the 
Cotabato region.  For more on Datu Uto, see Ileto (2007). 
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American period.  A clear example was when Datu Piang pointed to the 
whereabouts of Datu Ali6 who had gone into hiding when he decided to rebel 
against the Americans.   
 In terms of how to deal with the Moros as a Southeast Asian society, some 
studies have explored and analyzed the attempt by American colonial authorities 
to model their form of governance to that which the British had in place in Malaya 
(Amoroso 2003).  Datu Piang’s behavior was certainly identifiable to the 
Southeast Asian orang besar’s whom O.W. Wolters (1999) paints as a figure who 
could project her/his power in order to gain control over the flow of commodities 
and the movement of slaves (Abinales 2000a; Andaya 1993) as discussed in the 
previous paragraph.  Instead, the ‘grand old man of Cotabato’ was painted as a 
collaborator (Glang cf Abinales 2000a), an attempt Abinales pointed out as loaded 
with problems because it automatically falls into the trap of using Philippine 
nationalist historiography as a means of understanding the Moros – something that 
he describes as putting the “cart before the horse,” because the Muslim-Filipino 
subject was formed after Datu Piang collaborated with the Americans (Abinales 
2000a).  And this is precisely the point – the Muslim Filipino subject, or even the 
Moro subject that was formed out of the colonial encounter if appraised under the 
lenses of Philippine nationalist historiography would fail miserably by mere 
timeline considerations.  In other words, it is an historical anachronism.  The 
bottom-line is that Datu Piang, being a Southeast Asian orang besar had a set of 
traditions that he referred to when he dealt with the Americans, which in fact was 
                                                                                                                
6 Datu Ali was the leader of Magindanaoans who rebelled against the US when the latter 
moved to abolish slavery in all forms.  For more on Datu Ali, see Ileto (2007), and 
McKenna (1998). 
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a result in itself of the colonial encounter (ibid; Wolters 1999).  This may indeed 
sound Sahlinsian but his responses cannot be construed as nativist since his 
actions were the result of the contingencies of the particular situation, namely the 
externalities he had to confront.  And while one may say that this is Sahlins 
exactly, I would argue that a “native,” let alone a “Moro” position cannot be 
ascertained since the “native” position had yet to be invented in the Hobsbawmian 
sense.  The only thing once can do at this point is to compare the situation of Datu 
Piang to the experiences of similar characters in the rest of the region.  Neither can 
we identify his actions with rat-choice for structural considerations were deeply 
ingrained in his actions.  The tradition under contention was clearly not that of a 
Filipino Muslim collaborator, nor that of what was to become known as “Moro,” 
because the Moro as a subject was created during the colonial encounter, despite 
claims of historical events that have supposedly caused the unity of the Muslims 
in the south such as the Moro wars.  The pattern of collaboration or of projecting 
an external power is not essentially a Moro trait but was shaped by the 
particularities of his situation at that particular juncture.  His repertoire was more 
akin to the continuities of Southeast Asian forms of leadership.  Naturally, the 
repertoire was ever-changing especially when one considers the fast pace of 
structural and institutional transformations within and outside the colonial state.  
These considerations had a profound impact in how the Piang family as embodied 
by Datu Piang and his sons viewed and parlayed with their colonial masters, and 
even with their collaborative counterparts at the emerging center of the colonial 
state of the Philippines, then a nascent Philippine nation-state. 
 
Intergenerational Shift and Pilgrimage 
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 Datu Piang himself went to Manila in order to represent the Moro people 
in the 1907 Philippine Assembly where he was appointed along with Hadji Butu 
of Sulu.  Datu Piang resided in the walled-city of Intramuros for the most part of 
his stay in Manila, and was noted as longing for the open fields of Dulawan 
(Harrison 1922).  When the Americans arrived in Mindanao, Datu Piang, was 
instrumental in establishing American foothold in what was to become the district 
of Cotabato by giving “valuable and effective aid in restoring order among the 
rebellious Moros and in reestablishing peace in the (Moro) province” (BIA 
350/21/496/Datu Piang). 
 The younger generation took on a different tack.  The selected children 
had to go to Manila for an entirely different purpose.  Perhaps one can call it 
political expediency.  While Datu Piang had to go to Manila to sit as an appointive 
representative of the Moro Province, he had his sons sent to the capital to study 
law, agriculture and education.  The three specializations were undoubtedly areas 
of expertise wherein one could have advanced oneself through employment in the 
colonial bureaucracy. 
 Manila had a qualitative impact on the Moros.  It has been noted that the 
“glitter” Manila had by relaying the story of one Datu Alamada who had 
surrendered to American authorities had a profound impact on the Moro leader’s 
thinking (Abinales 2000a).  I have also used this story in the previous chapter to 
emphasize the allure of Manila and what it represented – a kind of cultural 
prowess that was attractive and desired to be possessed as evidenced by Datu 
Alamada’s desire to have schoolhouses be built in his domain (Harrison 1922).  
Once in Manila, Datu Piang’s scions engaged in training themselves accordingly 
in their assigned specializations.  Abdullah trained in the field of law while 
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Ugalingan went on to study agriculture at the Central Luzon Agricultural School 
in Manila (Abinales 2000a).  Gumbay, the youngest of the three went on to study 
pedagogy at the Philippine Normal School (PNS), a career that then brought about 
a promising future because of the continually expanding educational bureaucracy 
that carried with it multiplying stable bureaucratic opportunities. 
 Gumbay Piang was said to have been selected out of the many sons of 
Datu Piang (he had 18 listed wives with whom he had 33 children) because of his 
stature and his love for books (Piang 2007).  Gumbay had his first taste of 
education in the hands of public school teachers in Kudarangan near Dulawan, 
where all of his brothers and sisters were said to have been required by Datu Piang 
to learn how to read and write (ibid).  He was said to have been restless and 
craved for more (ibid).  The story goes like this: one afternoon, Gumbay was able 
to convince his father to send him to Manila to further his studies (ibid).  Like 
most other subjects of the colonial state, householding and agriculture was a 
mainstay in the primary education system (Goh 2008).  As such, Gumbay, like his 
siblings who were attending school had to maintain a patch of garden, regularly 
evaluated by their teachers.  Datu Piang inquired, in that afternoon, how Gumbay 
planned to maintain his patch if he kept on sticking his nose closely to the books 
he was reading (Piang 2007).  He had a plan to cultivate plants that practically 
grew wildly like weed, and in the end it was decided that Gumbay was to go to 
Manila to further his studies (ibid). 
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 In Manila, Gumbay excelled in most of his courses (Piang 2009).7  He rose 
to be respected by his peers, landing him the top post in the PNS student body, the 
Class President of 1926 (LWP; First Congress of the Republic of the Philippines 
1949).  The cohort was composed of students from all over the Philippines with at 
least one student representing each province except for Lanao, Davao, Batanes, 
and an unidentified other (LWP).  In the class of educational pilgrims, there were 
two Siamese, and two Moros with the latter occupying positions of responsibility 
in the student body (ibid).  Gumbay Piang was the President of his class as 
mentioned above, and the daughter of Hadji Butu (the Sultan of Sulu’s raja muda 
or heir apparent), Scott Rasul, was the matron of the PNS Girls Dormitory (ibid). 
 Leonard Wood, then Governor-General of the Philippines, wrote to 
Gumbay Piang a message extending his congratulations to him and to the class, 
felicitating the students in the occasion of their finishing by highlighting the roles 
that they had to take as new teachers in the colonial bureaucracy (ibid).  Wood 
emphasized that “there is no more important class in the community than the 
teaching class,” adding that they “have in their hands to do much toward turning 
out not only well-trained boys and girls but boys and girls with the right ideas of 
the obligations of good citizenship” (ibid).  The hand of the state is thus seen in 
this instance when the emphasis on the new teachers’ responsibility in colonial 
subject formation was emphasized by no less than the head of government through 
public instruction of civics and culture.  Also, this is reminiscent of Anderson’s 
discussion of educational pilgrimage in the formation of what he calls an “official 
nationalism.”  Naturally, the training would have entailed the transformation of                                                                                                                 
7 All school records at the Philippine Normal School (Philippine Normal University today) 
have been destroyed in the Second World War and are beyond retrieval. 
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these new teachers into enablers of the colonial state, able to dispense “white 
love” (Rafael 2000) under the aegis of an expanding colonial educational 
bureaucracy.  In addition, Leonard Wood was delighted “to see that the Moros and 
Igorots and other non-Christians have held their own so creditably with the 
Christian students” (ibid), a gleeful response to the project of disciplining the 
population into a bound series (Anderson 1998).  This line, emphasizes the 
celebratory mood that the Governor-General had when he saw that the Moros and 
Igorots were slowly becoming capable of engaging the Christian majority of the 
colonial state, not necessarily being assimilated but able to stand side-by-side, in 
some kind of bound seriality (ibid). 
 Apart from that of Anderson’s theoretical musings, an interesting 
theoretical conjecture can be made at this point with regard to the sojourn.  A 
Southeast Asian orang besar is known to have a trait that distinguishes them from 
the rest of the population.  They are know to possess what O.W. Wolters describes 
as the soul stuff that they sometimes have contained in a object – a talisman or an 
amulet, or rather they become the talisman or amulet when they become the bearer 
of the essence (Wolters 1999).  The said soul stuff is usually obtained by one 
orang besar when they go or are sent into a sojourn to the forest, jungle, or 
wilderness where they are changed, shaped by the spirits or by whatever force 
bestows them such mystical prowess (ibid).   
 The sojourn to Manila made a profound impact on the Piangs.  Gumbay, 
for one, had an opportunity to encounter whatever counterpart they (Moros) had 
as part of a bound series as all but four provinces were represented in his class of 
1926 at the Philippine Normal School (Piang 2007; Anderson 1998, LWP).  While 
there are not many accounts with regard to Datu Piang’s impressions of the city 
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and what he thought of it after his tenure as appointed representative in the 
Philippine Assembly when he returned to Dulawan, the argumentative case that 
Manila had made a qualitative shift with regard to his attitudes towards the 
colonial masters and his counterparts from the rest of the Philippines can still be 
made. Certainly, Datu Piang was plugged in to the narrative of colonial state 
building, but one cannot say that he bought the narrative and consumed it as a 
given or even the trajectory or trend of the nascent nation-state at that point as will 
soon be demonstrated, as his sons became the next appointive representatives of 
the province while he remained in Cotabato as a successive member of the 
Provincial Board.  A certain Stephen Duggan was able to meet Datu Piang in 1924 
when he joined the Philippine Educational Commission and traveled around the 
Philippine Islands (Duggan 1972).  The same person was able to interact with 
Datu Piang and he gives us a glimpse as to what the latter thought about Filipinos.  
Duggan recounts Datu Piang’s insistent point “that Moros had never been under 
the control of Filipinos and never will be” (ibid).  Datu Piang has clearly solidified 
his stance when it came to the Moro’s position in the colonial state matrix 
regardless of the advances made by Filipinization.  It remains to be seen whether 
Datu Piang’s exposure to the said bound series allowed for the solidification of his 
political position when he was in Manila, in a more or less similar vein that his 
son Gumbay had as mentioned above.  The result of Datu Piang having been 
appointed a representative for his people in the first Philippine Assembly was his 
inclusion as part of a represented bound series in the colonial state, the template 
upon which the nascent nation-state took for its own.  Having said that, it is 
possible to say that the same was the operative effect of his sons having been 
appointed as representatives of Mindanao with Ugalingan and Abdullah holding 
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the appointive positions in their father’s absence in the capital (Piang 2007).  
Duggan (1972) makes the qualitative departure of Datu Piang’s sons clear when 
he recounted the Moro leader’s ‘despotic’ tendencies when the latter had ordered 
some of his men to stay up all night to create a bolo8 for each of the Committee’s 
members.  He noted that the sons have emerged as some of the most progressive 
leaders of the Moro people (ibid).  This pattern however is not unique to the 
Piangs in the matrix of the colonial state.  In fact, McCoy (1995) accounts for this 
pattern in his introductory essay in the anthology of scholarly texts on the 
political-economic family elites in the Philippines titled An Anarchy of Families.  
He traces the contours of the metamorphosis of Filipino local elites in their 
transition from dark and shrewd characters in history to more enlightened and 
progressive beacons of leadership, usually achieved through an intergenerational 
transition (ibid). 
 When the Piangs returned to Cotabato, they brought with them intellectual 
and social capital; one could surmise that these were then what would have been 
the amulets and the talismans or the soul stuff that orang besars return with after 
their sojourn.  Gumbay Piang for one was a trained teacher after finishing his 
course at the Philippine Normal School, with a degree in pedagogy and 
anthropology to boot!  Menandang Piang was the first Muslim lawyer in the 
Philippines, as Abdullah followed in his footsteps (Piang 2007).  Gumbay was 
also plugged into the colonial masters’ homeland – he was a member of the 
National Education Association of the United States, and the Society for the 
Advancement of Education, Inc (ibid).  These amulets and talismans made them 
                                                                                                                
8 A jungle knife/machete commonly used in the the Philippines and Indonesia. 
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distinct in the society to which they came from.  Having these associational ties 
and degrees put them in a strategic position not only of that of an interlocutor-
collaborator, but also enhanced their prowess in the eyes of their constituents.  
These, in light of their position in colonial society (in the national and local 
levels), were the elements of the cultural repertoire, their subject position that they 
had as a ‘take-away’ from their sojourn in Manila. 
 
Tensions and Allegiances Amidst Structural Changes 
 Naturally, the Moro leaders had to figure out how to position themselves 
in the matrix of colonial governance once the policy of the Americans with 
respect to the Moros became clearer over time.  The Americans were largely 
flippant as regards the political status of the Moros during their presence in 
Mindanao (Abinales 2000a).  During the first few years, pacification was the order 
of the day (Gowing 1983; Abinales 2000a; Kramer 2006).  This was one of the 
justifications why the Moro province was strategically separated as a “regime 
within a regime,” able to dispense governmental action largely independent of the 
powers that be in Manila (Abinales 2000a). 
 When the Moro province was established pursuant to Act 787 passed by 
the Philippine Commission, the territory was divided into five districts, with the 
province able to pass laws that created municipalities and tribal wards (Gowing 
1983; Golay 1997).  The district of Cotabato had eighteen tribal wards and two 
municipalities, wherein the first distinction was specifically designed to 
accommodate a simple structure of governance that addressed the general 
concerns of constituencies such as the administration of justice, making 
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distinctions between Christian settlers and Moros who had a different set of 
traditions and customs pertaining to what is fair in view of their customs and 
traditions (Gowing 1983).  Another major transition was the passage by the Moro 
Province Legislative Council of an act that outlawed slavery, which caused a 
falling out between American authorities and a prominent Moro leader in the 
Cotabato district, Datu Ali (Gowing 1983; Abinales 2000a; Wolters 1999; Beede 
1994).  Then Moro Province Governor, General Leonard Wood led a campaign to 
crush Datu Ali’s rebellion (ibid).  The capture of Ali and his death is usually 
identified as the last major outburst in the district.  Peace reigned in the province 
and in the district from 1906-1909, save for some minor disturbances (ibid; 
McKenna 1998).  During the said years, General Tasker Bliss, the Governor of the 
province, pursued a policy of disarming the local leaders (ibid).  The relative 
peace allowed for succeeding officials such as General John Pershing to introduce 
policies that sought to encourage more participation from the Moros in the public 
school system (Gowing 1983). 
 The victory of the Democrats in the presidential elections of 1912 meant 
the doom of the continuous Republican agenda of containing what was called the 
“agitation” of Filipino nationalists who were calling on the US to honor its 
commitments to grant the Philippines its independence.  This turnover in the 
colonial metropole had major policy implications for the Moro Province, one of 
which was its abolition.  American colonial officials who were stationed in the 
islands after the turnover were generally sympathetic to the nationalist cause and 
translated into many policy shifts and reversals.  For example, the abolition of the 
Province and the creation of a Department of Mindanao and Sulu were geared 
towards the gradual integration of the said territory into the Philippines, with the 
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mission of transforming the districts into regular provinces in the long term 
(Gowing 1983; Abinales 2000a).   
 During the period of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu from 1914 to 
1920, Datu Piang served as an Assemblyman for the second district of the 
Department from 1916 to 1919, the Fourth Assembly.  His career as 
Assemblyman was punctuated by the abolition of the Department when the 
territory was placed under the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes that reported to the 
Department of Interior, a move that was intended to further hasten the integration 
of the territory into the rest of the Philippines.  The abolition of the Department 
overlapped with his career as the representative of the third district during the 
Fifth Assembly.  In the Sixth and Seventh Assembly, Ugalingan and Abdullah 
served in their father’s stead, the time frame of which is from 1922 to 1928.  The 
occupation of positions of power and influence by the Piangs at an appointive 
capacity served to strengthen their hold on power.  This can be seen as a double-
edged sword, however.  While they did benefit from the appointive nature of the 
office that they dispensed, they were also less embroiled in a political activity that 
lowland Christian Filipinos up north were becoming more well versed in as time 
went by.  Even more important was the reconfiguring of their cultural repertoire in 
engaging the rest of their fellow collaborators in the colonial state.  This 
reconfiguring is evidenced in the pronouncements made by Abdullah Piang who 
was sitting as Assemblyman for his district in 1927 where he stated that his 
brother Ugalingan was “wrong” in supporting a bill that would have separated 
Moros from the Philippines (BIA 350/5/541/4325A).  Abdullah noted that perhaps 
Uga was “not aware of the motive behind the bill” (ibid).  The comments were 
published in the Philippine Herald, obviously geared towards the consumption of 
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an audience situated in Manila, the reason being is that Abdullah generally agreed 
with the bill as evidenced by his expressed desire to join a delegation of Moros 
who were tasked to go to Washington, D.C. to lobby for the passage of the said 
bill (JRH 28/26).  In the next chapter, I will be discussing the said bill in more 
detail. 
 
The Moros Adapt 
 This chapter served to highlight the variables in the formation of 
subjectivities, the colonial encounter, and colonial state building.  It looked at how 
these variables intersected each other within the field of colonialism.  It has shown 
that the colonial encounter, as extended through the process of collaboration, was 
instrumental in forming and reforming the Moro repertoire that was crucial in that 
question that I have posited in the previous chapter, which in turn answers the 
central question of this research endeavor. 
 As the structural changes were effected in the period of 1900 to 1926, 
allegiances became clearer as the policy of the Americans with regard to the status 
of the Moros and of the Philippine Islands in general became more concrete.  The 
passage of the Jones Law of 1916, which in principle codified the promise of the 
granting of political independence to the Philippines, along with the outward 
confirmation of the policy of integration through the abolition of the Moro 
Province and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu’s similar fate made the 
trajectory clear to the Moros who were, as a response reconfiguring their 
repertoire in terms of how they would engage the colonial state.  The said 
reconfiguring of their repertoire was consistent with the colonial encounter and it 
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also highlights the embeddedness of the actors when they exercised their agency 
in their responses to the changes in the overall structure of engagement.   
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Chapter 3: The Bacon Bill 
Filipinization and the Desire for Similitude 
 As mentioned in the first chapter the year 1926 is used by this research as 
a turning point because it allowed Moro elites to express their sentiments that 
were swept under the rug during the process of Filipinization.  This chapter deals 
with 1926 as a turning point wherein the intersection of subject formation and the 
said turning point is examined closely.  It looks at the how the Moro elites, as a set 
of marginalized elites among peers of elites in a particular territory, while 
deploying their cultural repertoire, saw the filing of the Bacon Bill as an 
opportunity for them to gain the competitive gaze of the colonial masters.  By 
partaking in the opportunities brought about by the confluence of different factors 
such as the defeat of a Democratic government in the US, which was more 
sympathetic towards Filipino nationalists, and by tickling the US’ need for a 
stable supply of cheap industrial material, the Moro elites expressed their latent 
desire to disengage from the narrative, the business as usual mode prior to 1926 
was more or less geared towards integration especially after the progressives have 
removed the Moros’ ability to physically resist by disarming them through the 
Philippine Constabulary’s arms control programs.  The said latent desire has 
always been there, and as I’ve pointed out was swept under the rug mainly for 
political expediency during the period of rapid Filipinization.  Surely, raining in 
on the Filipino nationalists’ parade was political suicide in light of the Governor 
General’s favorable view of expedited autonomy. 
Before engaging in the discussion of what the Bacon Bill is, a 
backgrounder is in order.  One major event in the period of 1903 to 1926 that is 
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very important to this project is the passage of the Jones Law of 1916 in the US 
Congress.  With the Republicans expelled by the electorate from Congress and the 
White House, a friendlier regime led by a Democrat as US President, Woodrow 
Wilson greeted the Filipino nationalists who were led by Sergio Osmeña1 and 
Manuel Quezon.  On the 29th of August 1916, Congressman William A. Jones 
(Democrat, Virginia) who sat as the chair of the House Committee on Insular 
Affairs that had congressional oversight over the non-incorporated territories of 
Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines, etc., succeeded in passing a bill into that law 
he authored containing the first legally binding declaration that the Philippines 
were to become independent after the territory had achieved a sufficient degree of 
administrative independence (Harrison 1922; Golay 1997; Kramer 2006).  The 
issue of the binding power of the said provision was questioned by virtue of it 
being contained in the preamble of the law and not in the body, but this 
technicality only served as a minor problem to the nationalists (see, Harrison 
1922, pp.192-201).   
Naturally, the national elites of the time seized the opportunity to advance 
the Filipino nationalist cause.  Various avenues were opened to Filipinos in terms 
of career advancement in the civil service while American colonial officials who 
held civil service positions were slowly eased out.  Compounding the exodus of 
Americans was the step taken by the US to join the First World War wherein men 
were called to serve halfway across the globe – in Europe to help out in the Allied 
front.  Contributing to the said exodus was the preferential hiring of Filipinos in 
the government who were trained in institutions established earlier by the colonial                                                                                                                 
1 Sergio Osmeña was the Speaker of the First Philippine Assembly after the general 
elections of 1907.  His political fortunes rose with that of his fellow nationalists in Partido 
Nacionalista (Nationalist Party), of which he was a founding member. 
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state (Harrison 1922; Kramer 2006).  Filipinization facilitated the steady growth 
of the nationalists’ political strength while at the same time creating incentives for 
local elites to further integrate themselves into the emerging national body politic.  
The Moros, in many ways, were of no exception given that the withdrawal of the 
US Army from the region signaled to them that they were to be integrated into the 
rest of the Philippines (Harrison 1922).  In Cotabato, we see the likes of Datu 
Piang sending a select group of his children to Manila in order to train as 
professionals who could strategically occupy positions of power in the emerging 
template of the colonial state as discussed in the previous chapter that talked about 
how the Moros adapted to the changing circumstances. 
As there was a rush to Filipinize the administrative instruments in the 
political bureaucratic body that replaced the Moro Province, and later on the 
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, Moro elites rushed to equip themselves with 
the qualifications to occupy the positions that were made available to the 
inhabitants of the islands.  Moro families were at first very reluctant to send their 
children to the schools established by the colonial regime for fear of conversion to 
Christianity (Gowing 1979).  Statistics shown by reports indicate that there was a 
steady increase in the attendance of children within the Moro Province from 1903 
to 1913 (Gowing 1983).  The reports indicate a slight reduction in attendance in 
some years but were accounted for because of a cholera outbreak in some parts of 
the province, particularly in the district of Lanao, while the drop in attendance in 
Sulu was the consequence of Jikiri’s rebellion (ibid). 
To be sure, there were still large segments of the population that did not 
comply with the government’s desire for universal public education as indicated 
by the same statistical reports – some increases in enrolment in the provinces 
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under consideration were due to the fact that these provinces/districts were 
migrant-receiving areas and that the migrants were coming from parts of the 
territory where education is generally sought after – Cotabato and Davao, for 
example (Abinales 2000a).  If we go down to the nitty gritty of the data, One 
would see that the net migration in the two mentioned districts of the Moro 
Province were at 32% and 30% respectively (ibid), while Gowing (1983) reported 
that 67% of the total student population of the province were Christian Filipinos 
while the Moros trailed at 24%.  Nevertheless, it is fair to say that families 
decided to ride the colonial bandwagon of education – a “prized possession” as 
described by the son of Datu Piang, Gumbay (JRH 27/30/2). 
Yet again, another turnover occurred in Washington – The Democrats lost 
control of the presidency when Woodrow Wilson stepped down as William 
Harding ascended to the White House (Golay 1997).  This led to the reopening of 
the political status of the Philippine Islands as a major issue once more.  The 
freshly minted Harding administration sent rapporteurs to the Philippine Islands 
in order to determine the status of the possession.  Their mission was to assess 
them in order to know what action to take with respect to the reality that was 
spawned by the Jones Law.  Sent to do the task was General Leonard Wood and 
W. Cameron Forbes.  The two chastised the Democrat Governor General Francis 
Burton Harrison, a Tammany Hall regular2 prior to his appointment in the 
Philippines (BIA 350/5/573/5075-A-1), for making undue haste to grant Filipinos 
control over the reins of government (Golay 1997; McCallum 2006).  The Wood-
Forbes mission conducted a tour of the islands, visiting all but one province                                                                                                                 
2 For more on the role of Tammany Hall politics in the Philippines, see Abinales (2005).  
Also, see Skowronek (1982), who discusses in detail the expansion of American state 
capacity and the machine-progressive conflict. 
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(McCallum 2006).  In total, they passed through 449 municipalities, traversing a 
total of 15,000 miles to consult with various leaders from different camps (ibid).  
Throughout the tour, Wood and Forbes heard politicians at the local level who 
would favor and express their disapproval of the administration of the government 
by Harrison and his cabal in the Partido Nacionalista (NYT 13 July 1921).  
Wood’s disdain towards the Nacionalistas became apparent in his banking on the 
fact that there were reports of dissonance from leaders from the non-Christian 
provinces of the Philippine Islands.  The two, especially Wood – because of his 
brief stint as military governor of the Moro Province, looked forward to their trip 
to Mindanao.  The result was that Wood and Forbes wrote a scathing review of the 
Harrison administration and criticized the Democrats and the Nacionalistas for the 
maladministration of the islands.  When the report was published, Leonard Wood, 
Harding’s rival to the Republican nomination for the elections in 1920, was 
appointed as the Governor General of the Philippine Islands replacing Harrison 
(McCallum 2006).  This move resulted to a colorful fireworks display in the 
islands wherein the Nacionalistas would attempt to wrest prerogative over a 
substantial number of issues that Wood attempted to reassert as the preserve of the 
executive sitting in Malacañang.3 
 
A Republican Revenge and the Moro Repertoire 
A few years later, a bill was filed at the US House of Representatives, 
which sought to separate a huge portion of the Philippine Islands with the face-
                                                                                                                
3 For a discussion on the tussle between the nationalists and Governor General Leonard 
Wood framed in terms of Progressive-Machine conflicts, see Abinales (2005). 
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value intention of reserving it for the population of the said area and subsequently 
granting it autonomy from a central political-bureaucratic apparatus that was 
emerging in Manila as the Philippines was on the verge of the Commonwealth 
years.  The infamous bill sought to grant political autonomy to the constituencies 
of the then defunct Moro Province, which encompassed the provinces/districts of 
Sulu, Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, and Davao.  In fact, the bill sought to have a 
larger territorial scope – the whole island of Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu 
archipelago – much larger than the original jurisdiction of the Moro Province.  
Was this some kind of revenge that the Republicans tried to stage when they came 
back to power?  In this section, I put into consideration two issues: race as a 
reason for separation and the motivations behind the Bacon Bill.   
When New York Representative Robert L. Bacon, to whom the bill was 
named after, took the floor to explain his introduction of H.R. 12772, or the Bacon 
Bill, to the House of Representatives, he claimed that it was a “measure that 
would retrace our footsteps to 1913” by recognizing that the “Moro problem is an 
American responsibility, [and] not a Filipino responsibility,” and that “ours is the 
solution to their problem” (BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393). 
In the same speech when he was proposing that there was a need for 
Congress to contemplate whether or not to amend the Jones Law, he castigated the 
Filipinos whom he accused of bungling governance by nearly bankrupting the 
government through the milking of institutions set-up for the benefit of the general 
population; case in point, the Philippine National Bank fiasco as an example of 
bad management on the part of the Filipino elites (ibid).  Proposals to increase 
executive supervisory powers were introduced, including the proposed 
appointment of an Insular Auditor who would have enhanced the review powers 
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of the Americans over Filipinos (MB 26 Dec 1926; BIA 350/5/542/4325A; BIA 
350/5/541/4325-367-393).  While taking a swipe against Harrison and the 
nationalists, Bacon praised the successes of Governor General Leonard Wood 
when it came to the plugging of the holes created by rapid Filipinization (BIA 
350/5/541/4325-367-393).  He praised Wood for reversing many of the perceived 
damage that Harrison’s administration together with his collusion with Osmeña 
and Quezon has done to the Philippine Islands (ibid).  Nevertheless, Bacon 
emphasized that Wood cannot do it alone, and that the “tyranny” that Osmeña and 
Quezon wielded needed a stronger palliative that only the US Congress can 
administer (ibid).  These, according to Bacon, were the justifications for the filing 
of the bill, and it serve to strengthen the need to contemplate the reassertion of 
executive control in the islands.4   
The operational ethnographic representation that was the default template in 
dealing with the multiplicity of ethnicities in the Philippine Islands during the 
period when Harrison was Governor General was that of integrationism – that 
essentially Moros are not different in racial composition to the rest of the 
Filipinos.  Given such parameters, they needed to be gradually pulled into the 
matrix of the colonial state.  Bacon, in explaining and attempting to justify the bill 
before Congress deployed the previously discussed ethnographic representations 
ranging from the purported racial difference between the Moros and the rest of 
the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands.  In the same introductory speech, Bacon 
described the Moros as “in fact…an altogether distinct people from the Christian                                                                                                                 
4 Abinales (2005) interestingly traces how the fight between the progressives and the 
machine politicians were played out in the Philippines.  Gov. Wood’s desire to have a 
stronger executive that would keep the parochial and machine-like interests of the House 
was a clear example of which.  In this context, Harrison’s dawdling with Tammany Hall 
helped to cement an image that this was a proxy war between progressive and machine 
politicians. 
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Filipinos – this not only in language and religion but in physical type and mental 
outlook (ibid).  Their spoken language descends from the Arabian with but a small 
mixture of Malayan words” (ibid).5  Furthermore, the New York congressman 
linked the issue of the said difference with the tack taken earlier by former 
American officials in the Philippine Islands – that the territory is not ready for 
independence primarily because of the problem of ethnolinguistic disunity (ibid).  
The population, he said, needed to “be unified…until they all speak a common 
English language” (ibid).  Having not a common language deprives the inhabitants 
of the Philippine Islands from becoming a nation (ibid).  This was clearly taking a 
different tack on the part of the proponent of the bill from how the metropolitan 
center viewed their colonial subjects, that of integrationism.  The ethnographic 
representation of what the Moros were by the US Army – to be governed by a 
more virile race – was once more making the rounds. 
 The same speech made a broad sweep on the ethnographic composition of 
the Philippine Islands where Bacon clearly delineates the difference between a 
Moro and a Filipino (ibid).  Abinales (1998) observes that the deployment of race 
and racism was commonplace earlier in the colonial administration of Moroland, 
particularly during Army rule.  He reports that Army rule, which called for a cabal 
of Army administrators, brought about a self-made image of stewardship within 
the military clique (ibid).  Army administrators saw themselves as the guardians 
and protectors of non-Christian groups in the islands from the “Filipino racism 
believed to be more powerful and sophisticated” than American racism (ibid). 
                                                                                                                
5 Even though the different groups that are placed under the rubric of the “Moro” speak 
languages that are more often than not mutually unintelligible; that these languages are 
generally accepted to have Austronesian origins. 
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 Beyond race and racism, Bacon also deployed a somewhat legalistic cover 
for his polemic while explaining why he introduced the said bill even if it had a 
patrimonial underbelly.  While saying that it was an attempt to retrace American 
footsteps to 1913, it was also a way for Americans to make reparations to the 
Moro people by honoring an earlier reneged treaty with the Sultan of Sulu: the 
Kiram-Bates Treaty (BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393).  He was using the agreement 
as a legal basis to reverse the process of Filipinization and reset the clock back to 
a time when at least the American Governor General of the Philippines had a free 
hand in appointing the public officials in Moroland.  This, Bacon proposed, would 
allow the “American Nation” to fulfill its promises and responsibilities to their 
Mohammedan wards (ibid). 
 Bacon was not alone in this purview.  His opinions were shared and 
trumpeted by American and Philippine-based US media and influential 
personalities.  For one, a Manila Times (13 June 1926; BIA 350/5/541/4325A) 
editorial saw it as an opportunity for “good” to “cometh” “out of evil,” the evil 
being the “dismemberment” of the Philippine Islands.  They were of course 
harking back to the days of direct American rule in Moroland, or at the very least 
the establishment of a buffer – the restoration of the abolished Department of 
Mindanao and Sulu, ironically a casualty and a complicit layer of the bureaucracy 
in the process of Filipinization (ibid).   Daniel Williams, the Secretary of the Taft 
Commission, noted that American policy with respect to the Moros have gone 
wayward ever since the Democrats took control of the government.  He noted that: 
 The outstanding mistake of the United States in its Philippine dealings has 
been the assumption that the native inhabitants constitute a homogenous 
people, to be governed and disposed of as a single entity.  As a matter of fact, 
there is no “Filipino People”; instead there are numerous “peoples” – the 
widely scattered population of the archipelago being split into eighty-seven 
ethnographic groups, speaking many dialects, differing radically in character, 
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in development needs.  This is particularly true of the Mahometan (sic) 
peoples inhabiting the great southern island in the Philippines, who are 
altogether distinct in religion, language, physical type, and mental outlook 
from the “Filipinos” – or Christian peoples – of the northern islands (BIA 
350/5/573/5075-A-1) 
 
 In Mindanao, the said “wards” and “Filipinos” took notice of the filing of 
the said bill.  It undoubtedly disturbed a hornet’s nest as nationalist leaders wasted 
no time in trying to attack the Bacon bill at every given opportunity.  For the 
Moros, this was the proverbial tipping point.  It allowed the Moros to revisit latent 
elements of their cultural repertoire, and relive suppressed tendencies of their 
subject position in their engagement with the colonial state, which was at that 
point largely controlled by a Filipino nationalist cabal led by the Quezon and his 
minions.  They did so through their responses which included sending signals of 
support for the bill.  They generally favored its promise of reversing perceived 
missteps in the process of colonial state building.  A flurry of petitions swamped 
the US Bureau of Insular Affairs, the US Congressional Committee on Insular 
affairs among others either for or against the bill coming from municipal councils, 
prominent personalities in Philippine politics, to ordinary students who were 
either self-supporting or pensionados (see BIA 350/5/541/4325-367 to 393).   
In response, Moro leaders assembled in the town of Dulawan, the power 
base of a prominent Moro leader, Datu Piang of Cotabato.  Here, Moro leaders 
from all over Moroland converged to form a body called the Moro Commission on 
Separate Government, headquartered in the same town.  In a petition to then 
Governor-General Leonard Wood dated November of the same year, Ugalingan 
Piang spelled out the need for financial support for a proposed delegation of 
Moros to make their sentiments towards the Bacon Bill known to the people in 
Washington (JRH 28/26).  The same petition was in a way a very cynical attack 
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on Filipino nationalists: they asked that the financial support should come from 
the allocation that the Philippine Legislature approved for the nationalist agenda 
of campaigning in the halls of Capitol Hill amounting to P100,000 (ibid).  
Ugalingan Piang pointed out that 10% of the funds should be “expended under 
direction and control of the Moro representatives to the Philippine Legislature, for 
the purpose of aiding and assisting [the] said mission in furnishing to the various 
congressional committees and to Congress information regarding the industrial 
and political status of [the] islands…” (ibid).  This frank fiscal tussle was an 
interesting episode when contrasted to the periods surrounding it – those prior to 
the filing of the bill, and immediately after it was defeated.  Before this, 
Filipinization was proceeding along like a train following a straight course since 
the passage of the Jones Law of 1916, which replaced the Philippine Organic Act 
of 1902.   
In the same fashion, media outfits that were overtly pro-American in their 
slant blasted the nationalists for what the papers called a failure to grasp the issues 
that hounded Moroland, and ultimately the implications of this purported 
ignorance to the Philippine Islands as a whole.  In return, Carlos Romulo, a 
Nacionalista, rebuked Leonard Wood and John J. Pershing (BIA 350/5/573/5075-
A-1) with the same accusation of ignorance when it came to the affairs of the 
Philippine Islands.  Subsequently Romulo was severely criticized by the 
Mindanao Herald (24 April 1926).  The pro-American paper made substantial 
critiques against Romulo, whom they painted as an outsider who failed to 
understand the dynamics of Mindanao and Sulu – that the abolition of the 
Department of Mindanao and Sulu and the haste taken to integrate the Moro 
Provinces into the Philippine Islands was a big mistake that led to many problems 
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that beset the region (BIA 350/5/573/5075-A-1).  The paper later on trained their 
guns at Quezon and Osmeña whom they accused of “playing criminal and vicious 
politics in causing the old Department of Mindanao and Sulu to be abolished near 
the end of the Harrison regime” (ibid).   
Attempting to paint a broader picture, Bacon proceeded to explain to the 
members of the House that the “center of the world’s activity [was] rapidly 
shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific…that for the sake of [destiny] it is to 
[American] interest…as well as to that of…the greatest dependency that [it should 
be declared that America has] no intention of relinquishing…control [of the 
Islands]…in the near future” (BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393).  Bacon, in 
explaining the above, was attempting to rouse the House members to answer the 
clarion call of opportunity – political-economic and strategic.  One may even 
relate this clarion call to America’s supposed manifest destiny.  This is arguably 
the meat of the bill.  But any person would know that with bacon one has to pay 
the price of consuming grease.  The Bacon bill indeed had its fatty side.  Having 
dealt with the meat, or as Time (5 July 1926) had put it, “dwelt chiefly upon the 
temperamental and tribal differences of the morose Mohammedan Moros who live 
in those places and the Christian Filipinos who control the present government at 
Manila,” Bacon eventually revealed to the public an underside that perhaps was 
best left for the consumption of business elite circles in New York.  Time 
Magazine’s (ibid) editorial take on the matter is worth quoting in length at this 
point: 
Last week Mr. Bacon read into the Congressional Record what sounded more 
like the real motive underlying the bill.  He called attention to a Department of 
Commerce report; locating in Mindanao, Jolo, Basilan, etc., at least a million 
and a half acres as good as or better than, the acres in Sumatra and Malaya 
where Dutchmen and Britishers raise raw rubber for the world’s markets.  He 
said, in effect, that whereas the “selfish, shortsighted” Filipinos have 
repeatedly refused to permit U.S. interests to build up much-needed raw 
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rubber supply, by refusing to permit public lands to be acquired in tracts 
greater than 2,500 acres, the Moros grateful for self-government, would not 
shy as do the Filipinos at the thought of “exploitation” but would gladly 
permit U.S. corporations to acquire, besides rubber forests, huge coffee, 
camphor, quinine and sisal plantations as well (ibid). 
It was made clear later on by Robert Bacon who at first was arguing for the 
separation of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan from the rest of the Philippines that 
the bigger motive for the said separation was a business impulse.  Prior to this, he 
was using arguments that were buttressed on the scientism (Rafael 2000; Kramer 
2006) projected by the Ethnological Survey and the subsequent obverse side of the 
integrationist report made by Dean Worcester (Goh 2007b); Bacon made his point 
very clear – that the filing of the bill was simply not because of the consideration 
of Moro difference but even more important was the commercial importance to 
the American industrial machine of having Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan 
separated and removed from Filipino control (NYT 27 June 1926; BIA 
350/5/541/4325A).  Unfortunately the US did not have the foresight to have 
anticipated such a huge demand for rubber unlike their Dutch in the East Indies or 
the British in Malaya, according to Bacon who cited US Department of 
Commerce reports (ibid).  The same report said that Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan 
were suitable for rubber plantations, with conditions comparable to those of 
Sumatra and Malaya (ibid).  Noteworthy is the fact that the places singled out by 
the Bacon Bill were in fact not entirely congruent with the original Moro 
Province.  While Palawan’s southern tip was home to a sizeable Moro population, 
the island was never a juridical part of the Moro Province.  Nonetheless, the 
territory was included in Bacon’s attempt to slice a portion of the Philippines and 
re-appropriate the said territory to a people whom he tags as radically different 
from the rest of the population.  The Moros would then continue to imagine this 
aborted excised geo-body as the purported Moro homeland. 
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 When then Bacon Bill was filed in Congress, the Philippines’ Resident 
Commissioner to the US House of Representatives cried foul.  He had accused the 
Republican camp of intimidation, of frightening the Filipino people (BIA 
350/5/542/4325A).  Guevarra, in unison with Sergio Osmeña, laid bare the bill’s 
intention was to frighten and to intimidate the members of the Philippine 
Legislature – the Philippine House of Representatives and the Philippine Senate – 
to amend laws regarding the ownership of land in the country (ibid; BIA 
350/5/541/4325-367-393).  Since the program of Filipinization started with the 
passage of the Jones Law of 1916, the nationalists have steadily become confident 
in exercising their prerogative over governmental matters.  This was strengthened 
by then Governor General F.B. Harrison’s attitude towards the nationalists that 
basically gave them a free hand over most things – the Governor General’s seal 
was in many instances a rubber stamp for the nationalists.  Quezon, among others, 
quickly assailed the Bacon Bill and its proponent and supporters by revealing 
what he thought to be the “real purpose of the Bacon Bill,” which was “to 
withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Philippine Legislature the fertile public 
domain suitable for the production of rubber, such domain being located in the 
region inhabited by the Filipino Mohammedans” (BIA 350/5/541/4325A; PH 13 
June 1926).  Quezon added that he smelled the lobbying power of American “big 
business” from across the ocean, and that it is regrettable that Robert Bacon was 
resorting to the classic divide and rule tactic in order to attain a selfish goal (ibid).  
Standing in defense of the Philippine Legislature, Quezon castigated Governor 
General Wood for clinging on to the pre-Jones Law period (ibid).  Even US  
Secretary of War Dwight Davis had to distance himself and the administration 
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from the filing of the Bacon Bill when he responded to Emilio Aguinaldo6 who 
inquired about the said piece of legislation (BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393).  While 
so, Davis defended Bacon by denying that the filing of the bill was not entirely 
motivated by business interests but took into consideration the welfare of the 
Moro Province (ibid). 
 The eruption of calls condemning the Bacon Bill, along with the Kiess Bill 
that sought to install an Insular Auditor who would serve as a check on the 
perceived excesses of the nationalist politicians who were in control of the 
Legislature along with the elected local government officials across the 
archipelago, quickly followed.  Filipino nationalist orators gathered in the Manila 
Opera House to denounce what some have called as a “wily diplomatic way of 
dismembering Philippine territory, dividing the Filipino people, and defeating the 
bid for independence” (MB 28 June 1926; BIA 350/5/542/4325A).  One Ilocano 
Senator questioned the US’ ascendancy to preach to Filipinos on how to deal with 
the Moros while they themselves have blood on their hands in light of the frequent 
clashes between the Constabulary and various groups, especially in the Lanao and 
Sulu jurisdictions (ibid).  Other venues in Manila replicated the event discussed 
above.  Political rallies were held in the Rizal Avenue Coliseum, among others 
(ibid).  
 Pedro Guevarra, the Philippines’ Resident Commissioner in Washington 
DC, blasted the New York Representative for his attempt to “[dismember] the 
archipelago” and for acting “contrary to the traditional policy of the United                                                                                                                 
6 Aguinaldo was the president of the aborted First Philippine Republic when Filipinos 
revolted against Spain.  Aguinaldo remained as a key figure for Filipino nationalists in 
their aspirations for an independent Philippines. 
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States” with regard to the Philippine Islands (NYT 27 June 1926).  Guevarra 
responded to Bacon’s contention that Moros cannot coexist peacefully with 
Filipinos (ibid; USNA 350/5/541/4325-367-393).  He said: “religious liberty 
exists in the islands and is guaranteed by laws enacted by the Philippine 
Legislature” (ibid).  Instead of playing the race card that imperialist interests were 
dealing to scare the Filipinos and let Americans do what they had to do as they did 
during the reign of the military governors when the Moro Province still existed, 
actors such as Guevarra took on the moral high ground and played their cards 
rather shrewdly by arguing that the Americans were in fact more retrogressive 
towards the development of Moros by the very nature of the absence of their right 
to suffrage (Abinales 2000a).   By lobbying for the Moros’ right to suffrage 
Guevarra has exposed the Americans nakedness – their democratic deficit by 
engaging in doublespeak – a charge that was congruent with the whole process of 
colonial mimicry (Bhabha 2006).  The “reformed” Filipino subject was thus able 
manifest the subversive element of the process of colonial mimicry (ibid) by 
exposing the Americans as nothing but a failed ideal type in the civilizing mission.  
The glaring naked reflection that the Americans saw in their Filipino colonial 
subjects was surely shocking to the colonial masters. 
 Further, when Guevarra criticized the attempt to separate Palawan, 
Mindanao, and Sulu from the Philippines, he also proposed that Moros, or more 
broadly, inhabitants of the provinces that used to be part of the Moro province 
should be given the right to suffrage (PH 29 June 1926; BIA 350/5/542/4325A). 
He went on to argue that the Bacon Bill was contrary to serving a useful purpose 
in America’s presence in the Philippines and to the spirit of democracy and will 
instead lead to the disintegration of the Philippines (ibid).  Having the inhabitants 
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of the said territory elect their representatives to the Legislature would serve the 
purpose of integration as the Moros would enjoy the same privileges that Filipinos 
from other parts of the country enjoy (ibid). 
 Petitions from all over the Philippines flooded the War Department’s 
Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA 350/5/541/4325-380).  The same was true in the 
US House and Senate Committees on Insular Affairs (ibid).  Majority of the 
petitions from the municipal councils were almost of the same format as if it were 
authored by a single person and they were written in either English or Spanish 
(ibid).  Some of the petitions had variations.  One such variation was the 
description made by some of the council resolutions that trained the nationalist 
gun on the author of the bill with an ad hominem attack that had a tinge of anti-
elitism in their attempt to pin down the New York congressman as a protector of 
American business interests and an enemy of the common Filipino people (ibid).  
The resolutions read: “Representative Robert Bacon of New York, a wealthy Wall 
Street man”  (ibid).  Another variation on the content in the petitions against the 
Bacon Bill included the so-called the flag argument – that the country must 
conform to the flag’s equilateral triangle and three stars that represents Luzon, the 
Visayas, and Mindanao (ibid).  At first, this may sound completely ridiculous but 
if one considers how the expansion of the United States across North America 
came about where there is a systematic attempt to follow the flag while the flag 
adjusted to the realities of the empire, the perception of absurdity ceases (Kramer 
2006).  Again, this may be read as the reflection of the imperial ideal type in the 
colonial subject.  Filipinos were however not united when it came to their stand 
with the Bacon Bill – a letter to the editor of the Mindanao Herald written by a 
Filipino who resided in Zamboanga narrated his sentiments about the ills that 
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came about when the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was abolished, or simply 
when the Americans were removed from controlling the said territory (MH 19 
June 1926). 
 While Filipinos were busy protesting the perceived attempt to stifle their 
quest for independence, the Moros were negotiating their precarious situation – 
whether to support the passage of the Bacon Bill that would retrace the footsteps 
of the Americans up to 1913, when administration of the Moro Province was 
handled by US officials with little interference from Manila (NYT 27 June 1926). 
One particular public display of which is the occasion in which Gumbay Piang 
found himself in a social gathering of an organization called “The New South,” a 
clique of Filipinos established by Manila-based Mindanao and Visayas folk whose 
purported aims included the representation of Mindanao and Sulu in the larger 
political discourse (MB 13 Sept 1926).  The organization was a reflection of the 
changing demographic balance in Mindanao.  The roster of organization officers 
did not include any Moros (MT 16 Sept 1926).  Those who were mentioned were 
“sons and daughters” of Mindanao and Sulu who had non-Moro names, and who 
were probably from families who have migrated to Mindanao earlier (ibid).  The 
gravity of Gumbay’s point was reduced into a mere footnote, without any mention 
of his or his peers’ presence during the event (ibid).  Furthermore, the point raised 
by a certain Mr. Cuadra from Jolo whom Gumbay claimed as his “colleague” 
were totally ignored by the reports made by the spot reports published by Manila 
newspapers (ibid; MB 13 Sept 1926; JRH 27/30/2).  The New South’s leadership 
represented another front against the segregation of Mindanao and Sulu, and were 
for all intents and purposes allied with the Nacionalistas at the very least when it 
came to the issue of Moro autonomy and the attempt by Bacon and his like-
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minded colleagues in the US government to slice off nearly half of the Philippine 
Islands from the hands of Filipino nationalists.  The meeting was very telling of 
how Manila-based Mindanaoans felt about the issue.  For the Manila-based 
Mindanao folk, the drive for integration was in full swing.  At this juncture, 
quoting Gumbay Piang’s speech at length with regard to where they stood gives 
us an interesting glimpse as to how they negotiated their position, on how they 
deployed their cultural repertoire as Moro subjects within the colonial state frame 
at a historical juncture that gave the glimmer of a possibility for disengagement, 
after which I shall proceed to make several points: 
As I have stated already, I am a Moro who will defend and, if need be, die 
for the sentiment of his people.  But I shall present the question as one who 
is neutral.  I am to stand in such a position that I may be 100% Moro and 
at the same time a pro-Filipino, you who are here being my friends, and 
taking advantage of the presence of some of the members of the Philippine 
Legislature that they may hear a Moro’s arguments against the Filipinos 
and the probable remedies thereof.  The first thing I shall do is to point out 
to you why a Moro thinks he has right to say he is not a Filipino and 
cannot be called a traitor to the Filipinos when he asks for separation… the 
Moros swore allegiance to the United States not because of the transaction 
between the American government and the Spanish government but 
because of the negotiations among the Americans and the Moros; and 
because the American Army conquered the Moro warriors.  The other 
reason advanced, that the Moros are Filipinos because both belong to the 
same race and with the same ideals, is a consideration easily put out.  The 
people of the East Indies, with the exception of the foreigners, are all 
Malays yet all are not Filipinos.   The Javanese and the Moros have more 
things in common, their color, religion, etc., yet the Filipinos would not 
dare say to the Dutch that the Javanese are Filipinos and should be under 
the jurisdiction of a Filipino government.  The American and the Canadian 
citizens, living on the same body of land, coming from the same ancestry, 
belonging to the same race, professing the same religion, speaking the 
same language, and with the same democratic ideal of government; they 
do not live under one flag!  As both racial (blood) and ethnical points are 
touched above, I shall not say anything more on that topic.  A Moro can be 
what he calls himself to be – a Filipino if he thinks he wants to be a 
Filipino or simply a Moro if he thinks he would not feel comfortable under 
a Filipino Flag (BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393; emphasis mine). 
The speech is very instructive as to how the Moro repertoire was once more 
readjusted to accommodate the structural realities that confronted the subject 
position under consideration.  First point, Gumbay forwarded the notion that 
“Moros swore allegiance to the United States” (ibid), an act that made them 
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ultimately answerable to the US on the one hand, while underscoring the US’ 
responsibility over the Moros on the other.  This particular passage gives credence 
to the notion that an older Moro subjectivity was trying to reassert itself at that 
point.  A lot of the justifications that the Moros were answerable to the US were 
made based on narratives of cultural difference of the Moros from the rest of the 
inhabitants of the islands and the attendant fact that they were autonomously 
governed by the US Army as a consequence of such differential marking as 
discussed in the previous sections and in the previous chapters.  And even if they 
had no difference at all, Gumbay’s logical response to the idea that Moros and 
Filipinos should live under one flag is attacked by using a North American 
comparison – Filipinos and Moros were haunted by the specter of the empire.  
Another justification was the signing of the Kiram-Bates Treaty.  After reneging 
the said treaty unilaterally, suddenly it became a moral obligation on the part of 
the US to honor their promises to the Moro people (BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393; 
BIA 350/5/541/4325A). The problem lies in the silencing of the problematic 
assumptions in the treaty itself.  While the Mindanao datus acknowledged the 
Sulu Sultan, the signatory to the treaty, as a religious beacon and authority in the 
region, the said Mindanao leaders had the real political power on the ground 
(Laarhoven 1989).  The realpolitik was that the Sultan was a nominal head of 
religion to the inhabitants of Mindanao.  Moro subjectivity remains silent on the 
issue and chose to use a more or less united front when it came to representing 
themselves to a broader audience, perhaps to strategically align their interests and 
repertoire with the Bacon agenda.   
 This purported unity was shattered further when Quezon and the rest of the 
nationalists found allies across a broad spectrum of petty chiefs in the Lanao 
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region.  While Quezon et al were pretty much successful in the presentation of a 
united front against the Bacon agenda and in projecting a conciliatory attitude 
towards the Moros, they found some leaders who were vocal in their opposition to 
the Bacon agenda (BIA 350/5/541/4325A).  Some Lanao leaders said that the 
Bacon Bill’s arguments are not tenable for several reasons (ibid).  The said leaders 
were echoing the flag argument, predictably (ibid). 
 The second point dwells on the last section in the block quote: that a Moro 
has the right to call himself whatever he wants to.  This, encapsulates how the 
Moro elites, especially those who belong to the second generation under American 
rule, positioned themselves subjectively.  Gumbay noted the slippery slope that 
Quezon and the rest of the nationalists were treading in the latter’s message to 
Moros that they “are one” (BIA 350/5/574/5075A-30), that by associating Moros 
(whose subject contingency were all but silenced by Gumbay et al) with the 
Philippine “nation,” he was arguably putting in place an argument that would have 
worked for an irredentist annexation of Java, who are according to Gumbay of the 
Malay stock ((BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393)). 
 On the ground, Gumbay’s brothers were already mobilizing whatever 
resources they could in order to present their side of the story.  The Moro 
Commission on Separate Government, which held office in Datu Piang’s 
bailiwick – Dulawan, was established in order to project their voice and make 
their thoughts on the Bacon agenda known to many (JRH 28/26).  The same 
commission petitioned the Governor General to intervene on their behalf with 
regard to the allocation of resources in the process of lobbying in the US Congress 
(ibid).  The Washington Star reported on 26 April 1926 that a delegation of Moro 
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datus were in Manila to voice their preference for American rule.  This also 
resonated in Gumbay Piang’s above-quoted speech, where he elaborated that:  
If the Moros were to object against the Americans taking their lands the 
former would then be between too fearful and objectionable daggers, - 
Americans at the one side and Filipinos at the other.  As a defenseless people 
they would have no other alternative but choose which dagger would be less 
injurious.  And, funny to say, they have already, since long ago, chosen the 
American dagger made of celluloid because they think they would be less 
vulnerable (JRH 27/30/2). 
The patriarch of the Piang clan added his voice to the equation by saying that he 
felt rather betrayed by the Americans when they didn’t hold on to their promise of 
American rule, again clinging on the purported moral responsibility claim  (JRH 
28/33).  In an interview with J.R. Hayden, Datu Piang described his desire for the 
improvement of “[his] country,” by expressing his desire for American capital to 
come into Mindanao (JRH 28/26).  He narrated that his sons have informed him of 
the possible benefits of the passage of the Bacon Bill; that his son Abdullah, has 
seen first hand the benefits of mechanized farming during his visit to the United 
States (ibid).  In addition, he wrote personally to New York Representative Robert 
Bacon congratulating him for filing a bill that would separate them from the rest 
of the islands while claiming that he spoke for all Moros and Pagans in the south 
(BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393).  We must be reminded that Datu Piang, while 
obviously interacting with colonial subjects formed during the American colonial 
period (i.e., his sons) and that he himself as a colonial subject has been shaped by 
the colonial encounter, comes from an older order of things.  At this juncture, 
Datu Piang as a Moro subject whom Abinales (2000a; 2000b) has noted as a 
transformed subject – from an orang besar to a colonial big man – aligned his 
political tack with those of the younger generations’, specifically with his 
youngest son Gumbay Piang.  This is important because while Datu Piang himself 
never flip-flopped with regard to the issue of his preference for American rule, 
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Gumbay and his older brothers Abdullah did.  Abdullah was once reported to have 
had a public quarrel with his other brother Ugalingan with respect to the latter’s 
support for the passage of the Bacon Bill (BIA 350/5/541/4325A).  Gumbay too, 
in his speech to the New South, pondered on the question of what it is like to be a 
“Southerner” while taunting the members of the organization that brandishes the 
name of the “New South” by saying that he has always considered himself to be 
part of what he called as the “Old South” (BIA 350/5/541/4325-367-393).  Also, 
Gumbay described the very treacherous tightrope act that he had to play in his 
speech – that Moros had the right to choose whether to identify with the Filipino 
flag, or not (ibid).  He himself has intimated in that very same speech that he 
considered the members of the organization as his brothers and sisters no matter 
what happens (ibid). 
 In the end the US Congress did not pass the Bacon Bill into a law and the 
Moros had to reconfigure their repertoire once more to accommodate the near-
certainty of the Commonwealth years or even the perceived independence that 
laid further ahead.  Save for some special cases in Central Mindanao, the dreams 
of retaining a portion of the Philippines as a territory, or even securing the bare 
minimum of asserting American big business’ foothold in a Mindanao-centered 
plantation economy failed. 
 
The Bacon Bill and Subject Formation 
 If anything at all, the attempted passage of the Bacon Bill served to 
reignite a flame that was nearly put out by the trajectory of integration under the 
regime of Harrison and Quezon that darted quickly towards Filipinization.  This 
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episode highlighted the pervasive fact among colonial states in their attempts to 
deploy ethnographic representations: that there will always be competing 
ethnographic representations for recognition based on acuity (Steinmetz 2007).  
The Bacon Bill episode of 1926 served to show to us the flippancy that the Moro 
subjectivity that Datu Piang’s sons had.  It also showed to us how quickly they can 
deploy and redeploy one ethnographic sketch in favor of another.  The sons had 
varying opinions with respect to the Bacon Bill based on varying ethnographic 
representations, while their patriarch, a creature of an older order was quite firm 
with regard to his acknowledgement of the Americans as ultimately his colonial 
overlord.  His sons, having been implicated much more heavily in the process of 
colonial state building through their participation in the bureaucracy in various 
capacities had to tread a precarious fine and sometimes blurry line between 
allegiance and treachery towards the Filipinos.  
 Datu Piang’s death functioned as a reaffirmation of the passing of an old 
order.  Abinales (2000b) noted that there was not much buzz at the (nascent) 
national level when the life of the grand old man of Cotabato ended on 24 Aug 
1933, right into the pre-Commonwealth years. The demise of Datu Piang can be 
said to be the final nail that sealed the coffin of that old order.  While his funeral 
was described as “grand” and was attended by at least three thousand mourners 
from across the island (PH 11 Sept 1933), his death however did not make a 
profound impact on the trajectory of the Moros as an alternative colonial subject 
within the project of American colonial state building within the geo-body of the 
Philippine Islands.  The bigger consequence was that the members of the younger 
generation of Piangs were left to tend to what the grand old man left behind.  And 
that was what they did – the younger generation of Piangs who had a different 
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cultural repertoire to their father, Gumbay specifically, slowly eased themselves 
into the frame of the colonial state trying to excise themselves from the purview of 
the old world of orang besars, and taking as their own clothing the newer 
ethnographic sketches that were more attuned towards integration.  Shortly after 
Datu Piang’s death, his son Abdullah followed in his footsteps (PH 12 Oct 1933).  
As a token of remembrance, the Ninth Philippine Legislature passed resolutions 
83 and 87, both expressing “the condolence of the House of Representatives” in 
the passing of two significant figures in colonial politics (BIA 350/21/496/Datu 
Piang).   
 Gumbay Piang was one of those who stepped up to the rostrum and was 
positioned to be one of the main heirs of the Piang family.  Gumbay was young, 
was married to a Christian settler in Mindanao who is aptly named Visitacion, and 
had a number children during the Commonwealth years.7  Gumbay served in 
various capacities with the Bureau of Education where he advanced his career 
until the start of the War.  Menandang Piang, a lawyer by trade, subsequently 
joined the Constitutional Convention of 1935 that drafted the Commonwealth 
Constitution that came into effect when the Commonwealth was finally 
inaugurated (Piang 2007).  Ugalingan, a key actor in the Moro Commission on 
Separate Government stepped up his participation in the colonial state framework 
and in turn became a member of the Philippine Legislature during the 
Commonwealth years (ibid).   
                                                                                                                
7 Noteworthy is the trend among Moro, or Muslim-Filipino politicians, who tended to marry 
Christian wives (I thank Abinales for this significant conjecture). 
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 Critical in the attempt to engage the hegemonic frame was their 
subjectivity as Moros.  The Piangs did not entirely discard their Moroness that 
carried with it the baggage of ethnological difference.  The year 1926 was critical 
– not that it was a year that American business interest nearly had half of the pie 
that is the Philippine Islands to themselves, but because it was an instance when 
the Moros were able to revisit their position as a colonial encounter produced 
subject that could potentially stand on its own.  After 1926 and in the aftermath of 
the Bacon Bill debacle, the Moros adjusted their repertoire, choosing to engage 
the colonial state as a Muslim-Filipino subject (Abinales 2000a).  In the next 
chapter, I will delve more into these terms of engagement, and how the repertoire 
and subjectivity was adjusted to suit the necessities of the time – that of 
Commonwealth period.  The following chapter will also study the aforementioned 
through the prism of the Second World War. 
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Chapter 4: The Commonwealth, the War, and the Republic 
The Commonwealth and the Moro Repertoire 
 In the first chapter I opened this thesis with a passage from a letter that 
Gumbay Piang wrote in 1934.  He had copies of the said letter sent to his parents 
and relatives.  At first, it may seem quite absurd to think that the letter had a huge 
audience that would merit a close reading considering the limited scope of 
recipients: his parents and relatives.  But when one considers how many wives and 
children Datu Piang had and if you consider further how expansive that kinship 
network is in terms of not just filial connections but even by affinity then it made 
more sense.   
 The letter talks about the importance of “your children’s going to school” 
and the lack of Moro participation in the public school system in general (JRH 
27/30/2).  Like the Roman god Janus, Gumbay Piang was speaking with two 
faces.  He was speaking not just as a concerned prominent member of the Piang 
family, but also as an agent of the colonial state – an educator who, in the words 
of Leonard Wood, “have in their hands to do much toward turning out not only 
well-trained boys and girls but boys and girls with the right ideas of the 
obligations of good citizenship” (LWP).  The letter that Gumbay wrote can be 
taken as a lament over the passage of the days of the orang besar and as an 
attempt to convince its reader that change was inevitable – that those “who will 
not go to school will be the cargadores, the poorly paid laborers, the tenants and 
the insignificant farmers of the future” (JRH 27/30/2).  At that point change was 
indeed palpable.  As I have brought forward in the first chapter, those who chose 
not to adapt to the changing circumstances were doomed to suffer the fate of being 
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relegated to the political and economic doldrums of an emerging new order.  
Gumbay Piang related his anxieties with regard to the fast pace of change by 
sharing the following in the letter: 
Formerly you transported your products up and down the River in bancas; today 
you use motorboats – not only ones (sic) a month as the case was ten years ago, 
nor once a week as it was five years ago, but daily as it is today.  Yesterday the 
carabao was used all over the island of Mindanao for land transportation… You 
all still remember how we objected to injections, vaccinations, and medicines; 
but now, whenever something is wrong with our body, we think of doctors, 
practicantes, and medicines – even if we have to pay for them.  The datus used 
to have the power of life and death over his people, but who is the datu today 
that may kill a person without answering for his act in the government courts? 
(JRH 27/30/2). 
The emergence of a modern state with superior technological prowess influenced 
the pace of change when it came to the physical and socio-political circumstances; 
this informed Gumbay Piang’s reasoning in his letter.  In the first part of the 
passage quoted above, Gumbay Piang talked about the change in physical 
infrastructure.  Following that, the second part talked about how people’s 
mindsets have changed with respect to new technology (i.e., vaccines becoming 
acceptable).  The last part dealt with an area that involved power structures.  
Political power was no longer centered on the orang besar of old, not even on the 
tribal wards appointed by district commanders of the past.  Courts, bureaucratic 
layers now held sway and created a more complicated political apparatus (ibid).  
According to the young Piang the best way for them to preserve whatever residual 
social, political and economic advantages that the family had over others was by 
partaking in colonial education, or by participating in the formation of colonial 
subject through the disciplining hand of the colonial state’s bureaucracy and state 
building activities.  Gumbay Piang’s letter was thus a blueprint for strategic 
adaptation to the changing circumstances.  His cultural repertoire in terms of 
engaging the colonial state was a classic strategy of creative adaptation.  Indeed, 
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the Janus-speak that was not only brought about by the contingencies of that 
particular juncture but also because of the subject that has been formed as a result 
of the past few decades.  While Gumbay Piang may have lamented the demise of 
such political configurations of society, Manuel Quezon and his fellow 
nationalists were busy trying to dismantle whatever residual political structure that 
may have been leftover from the days of the orang besar (more on this in the 
succeeding sections; Abinales 2000a).    
 After the tumult of 1926, the Commonwealth years were fast approaching.  
The Moros were left with the option to engage the colonial state especially since 
the latter provided incentives for participation.  Thus it was that since the end of 
Army rule in the Moro Province, which has become synonymous with direct 
American administration, that the territory under consideration became what was 
a “regime within a regime” (ibid) into a “colony’s colony” (Hayden 1958).  But in 
what terms did the Moros engage the matrix of an emerging Philippine nation-
state?  As demonstrated by the previous chapters with respect to the changes in the 
cultural repertoire of the Moro subject, what were the changes in the said 
repertoire that the Moros had in parlaying with Filipino nationalists?  The 
succeeding sections attempt to address these questions. 
 
The Muslim Filipino Subject 
 Aluya Alonto, Lanao’s delegate in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, 
said that he and his people did not wish “to be called ‘Moros’,” rejecting otherness 
at a racial or ethnic level (Alonto c.f. Abinales 2000b).  The semantic reference 
carried with it the baggage of the colonial state’s actions that marked them as 
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different at the ethnological level.  Alonto then requested that the Convention 
refer to them as “Mohammedan Filipinos,” a category that safely falls within the 
rubric of an emerging Filipino state, whether colonial or national (ibid).  Even 
earlier, Abdullah Piang publicly proclaimed that he would “choose to live in 
Manila” if the Bacon Bill is passed by the US Congress into law because “I do not 
want to separate from you… Look at my skin!  The blood that runs in my veins is 
not different from that of you Christian Filipinos” (Piang c.f. Abinales 2000b). I 
am aware that I may be accused of deploying these statements anachronistically.  I 
offer this as a palliative to the perceived anachronism: that during the 1920s and in 
the 1930s especially before the Commonwealth period, notions similar to 
Abdullah Piang and Aluya Alonto’s points were already present.  The reason why 
these sentiments were not apparent is because Moro leaders were quick to dismiss 
them in order to project an image of unity within their ranks.  As I have said in the 
previous chapter, Moros exhibited cracks too when the Bacon Bill was filed in the 
US Congress – case in point, the Lanao datus who filed their petitions before the 
Bureau of Insular Affairs (BIA 350/5/541/4325A).  Filipinos too exhibited 
disunity as I have highlighted in the previous chapter (MH 19 June 1926).  As 
history narrates, the Bacon Bill did not see the light of day after 1926.  Robert 
Bacon never filed it again after his failed second attempt to do so in December of 
the same year.  His obituary did not even mention this issue (NYT 14 Sept 1938).  
Considering that it catapulted his name into the rostrum of US transnational 
history one would think that the obituary writers would mention something about 
this particular episode in his career as a congressman.  Perhaps its failure and 
subsequent backfiring were reasons enough to have had it swept under the rug.  
Abdullah Piang’s emphasis on blood and skin color, and his expression of his 
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willingness to be dislocated spatially if the said bill passes through the US 
Congress are clearly calibrated tactics that reinforced an already assumed racial 
bond or even oneness.  By conjuring images of place-affinity and consanguinity, 
Abdullah Piang and Aluya Alonto solidified the idea of an indestructible union 
between the ‘Mohammedan Filipinos’ and their Christian brothers.  Rhetoric and 
repetition placed this ‘fact’ to be indestructible, very much like the flag argument.   
It was eventually taken as a given.  This became the new repertoire for the Muslim 
Filipinos. 
 
New Trajectories and Integration 
 How then does the Muslim Filipino fit into the frame of the colonial state?   
The passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act solidified the position of Filipino 
nationalists, especially since a date was finally set when the islands were to be 
released from American control.  While significant separatist tendencies in the 
south were suppressed with near finality before the inauguration of the Philippine 
Commonwealth, the question on how the emerging nation-state was to deal with 
its internal Others still emerged from time to time, more so as the Commonwealth 
years came even closer.  Muslim Filipinos were almost always the objects of the 
said question.  Many propositions were made with respect to how to deal with the 
Muslim Filipinos at least at the governmental, and bureaucratic level.  
Propositions for the revival of some sort of autonomy were revived perhaps in 
order to contain the purported difference – a potential source of instability – 
between Christian and Muslim Filipinos.  The critical departure from the former 
mold was that this autonomy was supposedly no longer buttressed on a 
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fundamental assumption of racial difference between Filipinos and former Moros.   
But like most other things in this world, transitions are rarely clean cut.   
 As racial bonds or difference were no longer the primary issue, differences 
in religion, traditions and customs became the new problem.  Moros were under 
the impression that they were to engage the colonial state as Muslim Filipinos 
who were to use markers of religious difference as an axis of participation.  This, 
in a nutshell, was how the Muslim Filipino thought that they were supposed to fit 
into the bigger jigsaw puzzle that is the Philippine Commonwealth and beyond.  
The emergence of Muslim Filipino leaders, who are at first glance very much 
proficient in the day-to-day activities of the colonial state, managed to sit 
comfortably on their chairs in Manila.  The suspended trajectory of achieving 
similitude in the arena of governance and civics via an integrationist route was 
resumed after the blip that was 1926.  While there were those who were able to 
engage Manila and parlay with their counterparts on more equitable terms, they 
remained a minority (Abinales 2000a).  Muslim Filipino politicians from 
Mindanao and Sulu did not discard their titles of veneration and authority (ibid).  
Instead, these leaders deployed them along with the new titles that they acquired 
through the colonial state (ibid).  This pattern of continuity – of Moros projecting 
an external force (read: Manila ‘intervention’ in lieu of American) to displace that 
of a rival’s (perhaps a local competitor to the spoils of bureaucracy and the 
political economy) – disturbed the republican sensitivities of nationalists such as 
Quezon because of the said continuity’s ability to contest the monopolization of 
state affairs or authority by the government (ibid).  While Quezon himself had no 
problem in appropriating and centralizing power for his benefit (Abinales & 
Amoroso 2006), he did have a problem with the continuing usage of the titles of 
Dangzalan, Lou Janssen 
Chapter 4: The Commonwealth, the War, and the Republic 
 
Page	   76	  
veneration and parallel structures of authority that came with the datuship 
(Abinales 2000a).  The problem with the configuration of having Muslim Filipino 
elites participate in the affairs of government concerns the nationalists who were 
forced to rely on the collaborative nature of their relationship that echoed 
overtones of American colonialism through participation in the affairs of the state, 
which then became a reaffirmation of the accusation that Moroland did indeed 
become a colony’s colony (Hayden 1958).  The configuration, in the eyes of 
Quezon, was also a potential source of disintegration because it had a nostalgic 
holdover of Moroland autonomy (Abinales 2000a).  This reason made it 
imperative for nationalists at least to have the said differences be subsumed under 
the emerging political body.  Difference had to be tamed.  Through the 
Commission for Mindanao and Sulu, which oversaw the dismantling of whatever 
bureaucratic structures that were not dismantled by the Department of Mindanao 
and Sulu, and the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, Quezon had the government 
work on steps of integration that was envisioned to be crucial in achieving the 
goal of regularizing the once special provinces in the south, thus erasing 
difference.  This policy affirmed Quezon’s maintenance of an ambivalent attitude 
towards Muslim Filipino authority and political leadership.  An important 
component of the task of integrating Muslim Filipinos sans traditional authority 
structures was the opening of the seats of representation in the national legislature 
to electoral competition.  The steps taken to have all posts in the special provincial 
governments that were contested through elections in regular provinces were not 
completed until after the war, however, as the gubernatorial seats were still held 
via appointment by the government in Manila. 
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 Nevertheless, the attempts to regularize the political structures of 
Moroland did not achieve the desired goal of quelling any sentiment that was 
sympathetic to the condition of difference that in the eyes of the colonial state 
afflicted the Moros.  The process of centralization may be said to have provoked 
sentiments contrary to integration along the way.  One such sentiment took the 
form of a proposition that was floated in a newsmagazine article addressed to the 
Constitutional Convention of 1934 - the creation of a Dominion government for 
Mindanao in order to address the condition of difference, similar to the 
arrangement that Canada and Australia had under the British Crown, or as the 
news article had claimed, the status that Alaska had under the US federal 
government. (The Herald Mid-Week Magazine 8 Aug 1934).1  The proposal 
involved the creation of a Dominion territory that would have administered what 
was the Moro Province (ibid).  It entailed the adoption of a different set of laws 
that would bridge the said difference.  The primary rationalization for this setup 
was to control or contain difference was cited as “psychological” (ibid).  The 
proposal was, at least at the conceptual level, a re-hashing of the old Moro 
Province’s autonomy except that it would have been ruled by Muslim Filipinos 
directly instead Americans.  In this proposal, the overtones of a Saleeby’s 
romanticization of the Moros are palpable.  The critical break is that a Muslim 
Filipino was mouthing this discourse instead of a colonial official.  The 
cacophony of proposals also included what Frank Murphy, then Governor 
General, called as the “New Deal” for Moros (The Tribune 23 Feb 1934).  
Contrary to the proposal made by the Herald Mid-Week Magazine, the Tribune 
                                                                                                                
1 Dominion status was also proposed for the entire Philippine Islands under the United 
States, but was more or less geared towards the retention of the territory (Golay 1997). 
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stated that the better arrangement was that of Murphy’s New Deal, which 
involved the completion of the process of unifying the Muslim and Christian 
population of the islands politically (ibid).  The proposal forwarded by Murphy as 
described by the Tribune was a critical departure from the previous agenda of 
“tolerance” that was taken on by the likes of Teopisto Guingona, the former head 
of the then defunct Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes; in fact, the Tribune was 
attacking the said “tolerance” of differences between Muslims and Christians 
(JRH 28/23).  One can surmise that this policy of not treating the Moros, or 
Muslim Filipinos, as a “ward of the government” (ibid) is also an extension of the 
previously expressed desire by the nationalists to extend to the inhabitants of 
Moroland the full rights and privileges enjoyed by the rest of the population in 
regular provinces.  Americans and pro-American newspapers weren’t the only 
ones who wanted to proceed with caution when it came to hastening the 
integration of the Muslim population of the islands.  The President of the 
University of the Philippines, Jorge Bocobo, came out strongly in his opposition 
to what he called the “assimilation policy” conducted by the government in the 
south (JRH 29/02).  A break from referring to the project of unifying the islands 
into one geo-body as integration, Bocobo referred to the process as assimilation 
thus highlighting the subsumption of the Moros under a dominant culture opening 
the possibility of some kind of cultural clash.  Bocobo’s position in many ways 
echoed the position taken on by Najeeb Saleeby when it came to representing the 
Moros in the colonial text.   
 Even if Quezon saw a problem with datu authority, and even if he 
maintained an ambivalent attitude towards traditional authority structures in 
Moroland, Governor General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. reaffirmed the leadership 
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prowess of the datu during his visit to Lanao on 23 May 1932 (JRH 28/34).  At the 
local level, Muslim Filipino leaders hoped that Filipinization would be 
accompanied by Moroization in government (Abinales 2000a; JRH 29/01).  
Muslim Filipino leaders appealed to the sensibilities of Filipino nationalists who, 
in the words of Sulu Mohammedan Student Association Vice President 
Abddurahaman Ali, were “in crying need of…Filipinization for the Philippine 
government” a few years back (JRH 29/01).  He cautioned nationalist leaders and 
common Filipinos who were not in favor of Mindanao and Sulu self-governance 
against what he saw as an error that Moros were purportedly incapable of self-
government according to some nationalists who were against the said autonomy 
(ibid).  Appealing to their sense of history – of what happened to Filipinos in the 
face of American ridicule towards the capacity of Filipinos for self-governance - 
he reminded the latter of the danger of falling so easily into the trap of pointing 
out the said incapacity by comparing it to how England easily talks about the 
“White Man’s Burden” (ibid).  
 The position taken by Muslim Filipino leaders in their dealings with 
Filipino nationalists prior to the turning point of 1926 did indeed change over the 
years.  Again, this is a clear reconfiguration of the said cultural repertoire that the 
Muslim Filipinos had and were deploying as their subject position vis-à-vis the 
Filipino nationalists.  They have adapted to the new parameters of the colonial 
state.  The Filipino nationalist agenda gradually became a coattail ride for Moro 
leaders after the dissolution of the Moro Province. 
 At the ground level, there was resistance to integration.  As I have pointed 
out in the previous chapter, school attendance in the Moro Province was not at par 
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with the regular provinces in the north.  When integration became the name of the 
game, the former districts of the old Moro Province that became provinces on 
their own had to catch up with the rest in terms of governance.  One critical 
indicator that was constantly monitored was the attendance of students in the said 
territory.  As indicative of Gumbay Piang’s letter, there was still resistance to 
sending children to schools.  One reason commonly cited for the said resistance to 
engaging in national education was the perceived Christianizing tendency of the 
system.  Gumbay Piang had to defend the schools to his fellow Moros in the said 
letter.  To allay the fears of the Muslim families, Gumbay Piang provided an 
explanation as to what the school system did, what it aimed to do and not to do.  A 
passage from the letter is worth quoting in length at this point: 
I am now going to show you that the school does not Christianize your 
children…  We believe that the religious training of any child is the duty 
of the church and the home [and] not an undertaking of a public-
supported institution.  In [government schools] we teach the children to 
speak the English language – a language that is spoken all over the 
world; we teach the children… things that will make them good and 
useful citizens.  I have stayed more than ten years in school, yet I believe 
that I am a better Islam (sic) than what I might have been if I had not 
gone to school.  In the school I learned to love my fellowman and 
family; I learned that murder, treachery, adultery and stealing are bad; I 
learned good manners and right conduct; I learned to live by the sweat of 
my own brow and not by begging; I learned to respect constituted 
authority.  In short, I have learned what I believe every good Islam (sic) 
should do (JRH 27/30/2). 
In the same spirit as that of Leonard Wood’s letter to the PNS class of 1926 
discussed in Chapter 2, Gumbay made the intentions of the public school system 
clear: to create citizen-subjects that are good and useful in the eyes of the colonial 
state and inevitably to the successor state of the Commonwealth period and 
beyond.  His polemic carried with it a sense of progressivism and a tinge of 
secularism that relegated religion to the private sphere so Muslim Filipinos can 
engage and parlay with the rest of the population of the Philippines on more or 
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less equitable terms.  Even if he did use a secular and progressive tone to justify 
his point, Gumbay with his knowledge to entice his audience by framing his 
message in religio-technical terminology quoted from the Quran, citing the 
Prophet Mohammed, “seek knowledge even unto China” (ibid).  He tried to 
strengthen his case by adding another passage: “the ink of the scholar is more 
sacred than the blood of the martyr” (ibid).   
 
The War, and Moro Representations in Propaganda 
 For the remainder of the Commonwealth period until the war, this tug-of-
war between nationalists and Muslim Filipinos was operative until the critical 
juncture of the Second World War disrupted everything.  One of the important 
things about studying the Philippines, or Southeast Asia in general, is the 
watershed moment that is the Second World War.  Scholarship on this particular 
period focus on the rise of peasant movements and the rise of communist 
movements in the region (Carnell 1953; Furnivall 1949).  In the Philippines, 
traditional historiography has treated the Second World War as nothing more than 
a brief interlude to American colonialism.  Some accounts however skirt this by 
highlighting historical breaks in the said period.  One example is the formation of 
militias that went on to resist the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands by 
local elites while other elites collaborated with the new imperial overlords.  One 
of the more important consequences of the formation of resistance movements 
against the Japanese was the unintended (re)formation of private militias in order 
to impede the advance of the Japanese war machine.  In Mindanao, Abinales 
(2000a) accounts for the rise of several personalities through the crevices that the 
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War created.  The accumulation of arms was one aspect of which (ibid).  Another 
was the accumulation of social and economic capital through the embezzlement of 
war reparation funds appropriated by the US government to the War veterans who 
served under the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (ibid). 
 What then are we to uncover if we analyze Gumbay Piang’s experiences in 
the war?  How did Gumbay’s views regarding the War and the Japanese advance 
change his subject position and cultural repertoire, the things that have been under 
constant analysis since the start of this thesis?  Gumbay Piang initially headed the 
Bolo Battalion in Mindanao.  Abinales and Amoroso (2006) point us to the fact 
that the stiffest form of open resistance in the Philippines under the Japanese 
regime happened in Mindanao.  Without a doubt, a huge part of this resistance 
was put up by the said battalion. 
 At the personal level, Grace Piang (2007), the eldest among Gumbay’s 
children, offers to us a glimpse of how Gumbay viewed the approaching invasion 
of the Japanese immediately when Pearl Harbor was bombed by the Japanese 
Navy.  Grace recounted her complaint to her father that it was strange that the 
Philippines would find itself on a war footing against Japan because of the 
friendly ties that she and her siblings maintained with the local Japanese 
population when they were staying in the city of Cotabato and in Dulawan (ibid).  
Gumbay Piang’s response was said to be stern and compassionate at the same 
time.  He lamented the necessity to go to war, but affirmed his friendship with the 
Americans at the same time, a clear and decisive drawing of the proverbial line in 
the sand (ibid). 
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 Gumbay Piang succumbed to further asthma attacks and his respiratory 
condition forced him to surrender to the Japanese (ibid).  This belied however a 
plan of his to organize a sizable infantry that took refuge in the jungles of Mount 
Peris in Cotabato to resist the Japanese Imperial Forces (ibid).  Unfortunately 
there is insufficient data as to what Gumbay Piang did during the said episode in 
Mount Peris.  Jeremy Beckett (1982) accounts for a monograph of personally 
written memoirs about the said holdout titled “Mt. Peris Echo.”  Grace Piang 
(2007) also mentions the said document, complaining that she and the rest of the 
resistance were afraid that Japanese scouts would hear the noise from his 
typewriter that clicked on throughout the night.  I have spoken with Erlinda Piang, 
Gumbay’s second eldest daughter, about the said monograph.  She recalls having 
seen it on several ocassions but could not recall the whereabouts of the said 
typewritten manuscript.  The Piang family has yet to account for the whereabouts 
of this document, sadly. 
 Back in the US, the war propaganda machine was churning out posters and 
literature with regard to the Japanese aggression in the Pacific and the defense of 
the Philippine Islands.  One can probably consider Florence Partello Stuart’s 
(1917) work, a US Army wife who resided in Cotabato prior to the War.  She 
wrote a novel “for young and old” titled Piang, the Moro Jungle Boy.  The novel 
is the first of three and in many respects was a pale echo of Rudyard Kipling’s 
collection of stories called The Jungle Book.  Piang, according to Stuart, “is a real 
boy” and later on acknowledges that she based the character on a real-life person 
whose name was also Piang.  Considering the timeline and the fact that Gumbay 
Piang never grew up under the direct supervision of an American named Stuart, It 
is clear that the character was not directly based on either Datu Piang nor 
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Gumbay.  It is possible that Stuart may have encountered a namesake of Datu 
Piang among his many grandsons whose story she could have weaved into a tale 
for the “young and old.”  Stuart was very clear about the objective of her project 
that she spelled out in the preface of the first book, which was to address the 
American “[ignorance] of [and total indifference] to our colonies across the seas” 
(ibid).  The audience that she had in mind for this particular book was the 
American populace who were largely unaware of the Philippine Islands’ purported 
racial variegations (ibid).  She acknowledged Dean Worcester and noted her 
“indebtedness” for information on the development of the Moro (ibid).  In the 
preface, she was echoing the position taken by Worcester after the Republican-
Democratic turnover of power whereby he called for the continued presence of 
Americans in Mindanao to protect the “nobility of the Moro” from exploitation by 
Christian Filipinos.   
 The last two books in the series were published in 1941 and in 1943 
respectively.  The second book was titled Piang the Moro Chieftain, and it dealt 
largely with the the coming-of-age of Piang (Stuart 1941).  More important here is 
the 1943 book that completed the trilogy.  Titled The Pledge of Piang, Stuart talks 
about the post-coming-of-age Piang and deals with much more esoteric subjects 
such as political allegiances and the “Japanese Plot” (1943).  In the foreword, 
Joseph K. Partello recognizes once more the racial difference of the Moros from 
the Filipinos, underscoring the contended notion that the Moros must never be 
mistaken for as Filipinos (ibid).  Partello goes as far as referring to the Moros as a 
“nation” (ibid).  He also acknowledges the fact that the “real” Datu Piang, which 
is most likely Gumbay in this particular instance since he held the highest rank in 
the Bolo Battalion among the Piangs, “fights on in the Celebes Sea against the 
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Japanese” (ibid).  At the end of the book, there is again an underscoring of a deep 
connection between the Moro “nation” and America.  The final passages of the 
book are worth quoting in length at this point: 
Half the column had passed and the color-bearers approached.  The Stars 
and Stripes were held high and steady.  Only the Regimental flag was 
dipped to honor the reviewing officers…The colors came to a halt 
directly in front of Colonel Jones.  The bandmaster raised his baton and 
the notes of the Star-Spangled Banner floated out across the jungle.  
American hands went up in the prescribed salute to the colors.  Out of 
the corner of his eye, Crampton watched Piang.  What did the jungle boy 
think of all this pomp and ceremony?  What would the chieftain do?  
Piang drew himself to his full stature, turned and looked directly into 
Crampton’s eyes, then turned back to the American flag.  Slowly Piang’s 
right hand went up, touched his headcloth.  Piang of Mindanao had 
saluted the American flag!  Hundreds of American voices broke into 
song. Oh, say can you see by the dawn’s early light… (ibid). 
Back to reality, the said connection was further reaffirmed at the conclusion of the 
War when Gumbay and his followers, along with fellow Muslim Filipinos such as 
Salipada Pendatun were honored with accolades by the American Forces during 
the War through telegraphic messages (ibid).  Immediately after the War, Piang 
and Pendatun were acknowledged as war heroes and were subsequently elected 
into public office as inaugural congressman and senator in an independent 
Philippine Republic respectively. 
 
Postwar Realities 
 Taking the reins, the newly-independent Philippine nation-state’s elites 
continued the policy of integrating the Moros way after the colonial period.  
Philippine Congress, in an act that demonstrates to us the continuity of the 
ambivalent relationship between the Muslim Filipinos and the nationalists, passed 
a law establishing the Commission on National Integration (CNI) to facilitate “a 
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more rapid and complete manner of economic, social, moral and political 
advancement of the Non-Christian Filipinos” (Congress of the Philippines, House 
of Representatives, 1957 Republic Act 1888, c.f. Gowing 1979, p.208).2 
This particular development in political and professional education that 
was targeted specifically on Muslim Filipinos is a clear signal of continuity not 
only of colonial policy, the aforementioned ambivalent relationship, but was also 
an indication of the continuation of the representation of difference which became 
a justification for the continued operation of a cultural repertoire that had a 
grammar of difference at its core.  The relationship between Muslim Filipinos and 
nationalists changed dramatically when the United States withdrew from the 
islands, ending its role as a player that ultimately had the final say.  They have 
been reduced to a less significant role of a passive observer, at least at face value.   
By and large, the creation of the CNI was an extension of the ethnographic 
representation and possibilities of how a Moro was viewed.  This governmental 
body had a vocabulary that exhibited continuities of colonial administration 
because it used the same categories and systems of differentiation among the 
groups.  With the said representations evidently still at work, the accelerated 
formation of a professional and political class of Muslim Filipinos was couched 
upon the said difference during the process of integration and assimilation because 
of the continued use of affirmative action to help them catch up with the rest of 
the population.  The CNI scholarships in particular became an avenue through 
which non-elite Muslims participated in higher education en masse for the first 
                                                                                                                
2 Abinales (2000a) has an interesting take on this – he said that the CNI was largely a 
creature of the pressures generated from the various groups working for a united 
ethnoreligious identity. 
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time.3  The alternative way through which this was achieved was through the 
proliferation of Middle Eastern scholarships, particularly in Egypt (McKenna 
1998; Gloria & Vitug 2000).  The result was the formation of a Muslim 
professional class amidst a political arena that remained dominated by traditional 
Moro leadership complete with cacique political trappings. 
Speaking on the traditional leadership in the area after the war, Thomas 
McKenna (1998) noted that Datu Udtug Matalam and Salipada Pendatun’s post-
war political relationship was something more than just an alliance between Moro 
datus.  For one, Pendatun was a Muslim Filipino politician who belonged to a 
clique of children whose education was taken by an American by the name of 
Edward Kuder who treated the children’s education with prime importance.  
Pendatun was voted into public office by the now demographically dominant 
migrant Christian communities on the assumption that they would rein in on the 
Muslim population in the province (McKenna 1998).  On the other hand, Matalam 
seemed like an oppositional figure to the likes of Pendatun.  Matalam did not go 
through the same schooling, which consequently left him less socially intimate 
with politicians from the rest of the Philippines who did their studies in Manila 
(ibid).  The lack of an educational pilgrimage, a process that Anderson (2006) 
identifies as a critical ingredient in the formation of a clique of elites who more 
often than not function as a national intelligentsia put Matalam in a different 
position when compared to Salipada Pendatun. 
                                                                                                                
3 To be safe, it would be safe to assume that a big portion of these scholarships still went 
to the children of elite families as part of the state largesse distributed as spoils in the 
post-war political economic system. 
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As expected, a Moro politician in the person of Udtog Matalam took over a 
role that the Americans played during the time of colonialism at least locally, after 
the war.  As the governor of the undivided Cotabato province, Matalam was able 
to “control” the Muslim population in the province, much to the delight of the 
Christian migrants who have settled in the lands taken care of the National Lands 
and Settlement Agency (NLSA), particularly in Allah Valley where the settlers 
have become the clear majority.  His tenure as governor (which was still an 
appointive position at the time) was highlighted by his self-proclaimed efforts of 
restoring and securing an environment of peace and order and the promotion of a 
harmonious relationship among the people of Cotabato (MinCr 6 Nov 1948).  
Though there were tensions, it wasn’t always the case that violence would erupt in 
the settlement process (Abinales 2000). 
Matalam’s position was strengthened through a previously discussed 
alliance with his brother-in-law, Pendatun, who has risen out of the ashes of the 
war to become an inaugural senator in the Third Republic.  Together, Pendatun 
and Matalam represented one of the main power blocs in Cotabato.  Thomas 
(1971) reported the sentiments of the Americans with regard to configurations like 
this by saying that they “wanted to lessen the domination of Christian 
communities by the cacique or landlord class in much the same way that they 
hoped to free the Muslim common people from the heavy hand of the datu class.”  
This largely represented the context wherein Moro leaders played out their 
new roles as local and national politicians in the Philippine nation-state.  With the 
Second World War over and the phantom of the Americans slicing Moroland 
away from the Philippines gone forever, these politicians proceeded with careful 
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craft to normalize the bonds that they have with their Christian counterparts in 
Manila.  There were however moments when Mindanao’s representation in the 
national government, and not just of Moros, was put under the microscope.  The 
interesting episode that highlighted this representational issue was when Pendatun 
decried the absence of any Mindanaoan in the executive branch under the watch 
of Manuel Roxas.  The episode is interesting because it involves Gumbay Piang, 
who in the past decried the advances of Filipinization and its marginalizing effects 
towards Moros on the one hand while championing the Bacon Bill on the other.  
This time around, Gumbay played the card of supposed unbreakable bond 
between Muslim Filipinos and their Christian brothers.  In a letter to House 
Speaker Emmanuel Perez, Gumbay Piang said: 
I read of Senator Pendatun’s and a crowd probably gathered by someone 
or some individuals to howl for the representation of Mindanao in the 
executive Cabinet, with the threat of Mindanao ‘again to ask for the 
division of Mindanao and Sulu from the rest of the Philippines’, to quote 
one of the speakers.  This saddens me, one who for years have been 
preaching for the unification of the Philippines into one solid ethnologic 
homogenius [sic] group– for every loyal and true Filipino race, who 
should strive toward the peaceful and meaningful fulfillment of the three 
stars in our glorious national flag… even if certain individuals prefer to 
sacrifice their nationality for a temporary non-appointment to the cabinet 
of a man from Mindanao, the organizers of the meeting and the speakers 
seem to ignore the fact that today… [that] there are more Christians than 
the native non-Christians now.  These groups of Philippine citizens will 
never consent to separate from their northern relatives, no matter what the 
reason might be… To [the] students present at the rally, I humbly 
apologize for this point of view of mine… As [a] member of the 
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives…I have 
empathically fought for the inclusion in our budget substantial sums for 
non-Christian scholarships and the continuance of national aid to the so-
called non-Christian provinces in our national budget…Of course this 
could be accomplished because of a Congress anxious to raise the cultural 
and living standards of all the ethnic groups of the country” (Piang 1948). 
 
In an interesting self-rebuff, Gumbay Piang colorfully illustrated the unity of the 
“solid ethnologic homogenius (sic) group.”  Gumbay’s cultural repertoire, which 
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included his tools as an agent of the colonial state as a native ethnographer official 
(having completed a degree in anthropology and pedagogy), was clearly operative 
at this point.  The usage of the said anthropological vocabulary coupled with the 
ever-present flag argument became the predicate for his seemingly local squabble 
with Pendatun.  The way that Gumbay used his tools for affirming the said bond is 
exactly the point even if it was based on a mere petty political squabble.   
 Gumbay’s letter to Speaker Perez offers to us a glimpse of how he 
envisioned the “unification” in the Philippines.  By claiming to have raised “the 
cultural and living standards of all the ethnic groups” in Congress as a member of 
the Appropriations Committee, Piang made known to Speaker Perez that 
integration, must be completed and consummated (ibid).   
 Another issue that Gumbay Piang dabbled in after the war that can be seen 
as an act of consummating the integration process is his sponsorship of a bill that 
opened the gubernatorial post of the several special provinces to election.  This 
move, while politically motivated to weaken the Pendatun-Matalam alliance, can 
be read as the Muslim Filipino subject representing itself as ready and able to 
exercise the responsibilities of a democratic societal order.  Piang justified his 
dissatisfaction with the appointed governor Udtog Matalam by describing him as 
an “illiterate” and that the appointment was a “terrible retrogressive move… 
moving backward instead of forward” (First Congress of the Philippines, House of 
Representatives, 1946, Congressional Records).  Piang described his actions as 
motivated by a strong desire for social justice in order to put at par the special 
provinces with the regular provinces (ibid).  Turning the gaze against the national 
government, Gumbay deployed the distaste for non-republican political authority 
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against the patronage politics that he saw emanating from Malacañang, the 
presidential palace (ibid).  Arguing that the rule of the appointive governors who 
had the power to appoint mayors, who in turn elect members of the provincial 
board, was autocratic, Piang turned once more to arguments of democracy, 
demanding a “square deal” by dismantling a “lamentable anachronism” (ibid).   
 Interestingly, participation in guerilla warfare also became a ground for 
highlighting unity among the people within the geo-body of the Philippines after 
the Second World War.  Piang couched his argument for the passage of the 
abovementioned bill further with this rationale by arguing how valiantly these 
men at the face of a massive logistical lack of arms did “everything to harass the 
enemy” (ibid). 
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 Chapter 5: Postwar Realities & Conclusion 
Contingent Subject Positions 
 The case of the Piangs and the year 1926 as turning point is illustrative of 
the whole point of the thesis.  Not only did we see the cultural repertoire of a 
single generation of Moro elites by studying the Piangs, but we also saw whatever 
metamorphosis occurred when the transition of power and responsibility was 
handed from one generation to another.  Along with this, we have seen how the 
said repertoire was adjusted to suit the situation and deployed to whatever the 
contingency required it to have.  The Bacon Bill, even if the US Congress did not 
pass it into law, remains significant.  It is significant because it allowed the Moros 
to express whatever nostalgic feeling they had for autonomy, and their desire to be 
separated from the rest of the Philippines as justified by the ethnographic 
difference that they imbued from the earlier ethnographic sketches that 
ethnographer officials painted of the Moros. 
 Using Datu Piang and his younger son Gumbay as points of analyses gave 
us a glimpse into whatever tensions they encountered.  It gave us the comparative 
gaze between two generations, or at least men of two generations, who have been 
described as different in terms of their worldviews.  Datu Piang himself was 
described as shrewd, calculating, and cruel, but at the end of the day his 
redemption was that he was a useful collaborator and that he found his alliance 
with the Americans to be too profitable politically and economically to resist, thus 
making him an indispensible tool of collaboration.  He assisted in the building of 
schools, roads, albeit making a profit out of the expansion of the colonial state by 
leasing these buildings to the state in its exercise of function, which had the 
Dangzalan, Lou Janssen 
Chapter 5: Postwar Realities 
Page	   93	  
consequence of enhancing that of his own.  His actions, while seemingly self-
serving however tied his fate to the colonial state apparatus as there became a 
codependence that influenced greatly the direction of Moro integration.   His sons, 
on the other hand were described as progressive, and enlightened while they 
collaborated on more professional terms with the colonial state as agents of the 
government from time to time. 
 One of the critical transformations that traces the same contours of the 
transition between one generation of the Piang family to the next was the 
transformation of the Moro into the Muslim Filipino as a subject within the 
framework of the colonial state.  This subject position along with its cultural 
repertoire went through the heaves and throes of the Commonwealth period where 
they had to negotiate the terms of engagement with the state since the nationalist 
leaders, namely Quezon, maintained an ambivalent attitude towards the dual 
structure of authority that emerged out of the collaborative setup.  It was also 
tested in the crucible of war.   
 The consummation of the integration process, at least by the Piangs was 
during after the war when Gumbay was gunning for the full integration of the 
Moros by the granting of full suffrage rights to the inhabitants of the remaining 
special provinces.  While his move was largely political aimed to destabilize the 
alliance between Matalam and Pendatun, Gumbay was still justifying this move in 
terms of racial oneness and historical solidarity.  To him, not granting the 
inhabitants of his province full suffrage rights was a huge drawback in the process 
of integrating the islands into the entire national political body. 
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 The subject position of the Piangs, whether as Moros or as Muslim 
Filipinos were clearly contingent on the realities that faced them.  They were able 
to respond to the challenges by creatively adapting to their new circumstances as 
discussed in the previous chapters, whether as an orang besar that had a Southeast 
Asian worldview, or as a Muslim Filipino subjects in the Commonwealth and 
postwar period that managed to reenter the game of integration after a period of 
tumult. 
 The creation of a Moro subject position has been pointed out in the first 
and second chapter to be a product of the colonial encounter between the Moros 
and the Americans.  That an existing subject position for the Moro is of course 
without doubt.  The key point is that the idea of a unified Moro front would not 
have been possible had it not been for this encounter.  The same is true for the 
Muslim Filipino subject as I have explored in the third chapter.  The colonial 
encounter, whether external (Americans) or internal (Filipino nationalists) was 
also instrumental in the formation of a cultural repertoire that was necessary to 
form a Muslim Filipino subjective position. 
 
Final Notes 
 A fair criticism that one can make against this study is one that involves 
the lack of attention that the thesis has paid to ordinary citizens and everyday life.  
This work stands in stark contrast to that of Thomas McKenna (1998) whose opus 
was very good at tickling the sensibilities of academics who are very much 
invested into the clarion call for a “history from below.”  This project is 
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undoubtedly and decidedly upward in terms of its gaze and does not make any 
apologies for it.   
 Essentially, this thesis has argued that the reason why marginalized 
collaborating elites in a field of multiple collaborators may choose to disengage 
from the narrative and process of colonial state building with a trajectory of 
political independence when given a chance is because of their subject position 
that was ultimately constructed by the colonial encounter and as continually 
reformed by the process of colonial state building.  I have done so by arguing that 
if marginalized collaborating elites have been marked as different from the rest of 
the collaborators in a given matrix of colonial state building, this will enable them 
to disengage from the dominant narrative through the strategic deployment of a 
cultural repertoire peculiar to them as ascribed by the grammar of difference.  As 
shown in the fourth chapter, Muslim Filipino elites generally continued pursuing 
the track of integration after the debacle of 1926, and further on into the early part 
of the inauguration of the Third Republic after the Second World War.   
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b: November 2, 1971
+Daniel NAEF
Ian Christoffer NAEF
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b: October 6, 1959
+Alvin ALLEN
Lou Janssen DANGZALAN
b: June 18, 1982
Jilian Zyrille CALATA
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b: June 3, 1996
Datu Dinn AMPATUAN
b: December 28, 1998
Datu Taharudin AMPATUAN
b: November 8, 2002
Hazma Jamillah AMPATUAN
b: February 8, 2006
Nuruljani AMPATUAN
b: 1981
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b: February 2, 1943
+Maria Teresa ELORIAGA
Mar Antonio PIANG II
b: February 18, 1969
+Joyce BOMA
Marie Antoniette PIANG
b: June 6, 1970
+Emil FLORES
Kirsten Arielle FLORES
b: August 13, 1995
Antonio PIANG Jr.
b: December 11, 1978
+Paula CLARK
Alyssa Mischelle PIANG
b: February 13, 2001
Andrue Markus PIANG
b: November 30, 2003
Apollo Matthew PIANG
b: December 13, 2007
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Sittie Shaira Mae TUKAN
Sittie Shakira Shahanie TUKAN
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+Dondon KALIDO
Don Emayr Albarr KALIDO




































b: September 21, 1984
Mohammad Al-Johanny GUIAMELON
b: December 22, 1986
Tarhata Joy GUIAMELON
b: December 18, 1987
Nurhassan GUIAMELON
b: July 24, 1989
Amilol GUIAMELON
b: 1956
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Jamiruddin GUIAMELON
b: 1992
Joeyah GUIAMELON
b: 2005
Jamael GUIAMELON
b: 2008
Annabelle GUIAMELON
b: 1973
+Yusef AL-RASHIDY
Ahmed Yusuf AL-RASHIDY
b: 2007
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